Analysis On The Evolution Of Stakeholder Behavior Of Water Quality Assurance In Water Project Sustainable Supply Chain

The opening of the operation of south-to-north water transfer,water makes up for the north and south region difference,solved the problem of water supply in northern groundwater along the covering significantly improved the local ecological environment,but because of the middle route of south-to-north water transfer channel for up to 1432 km,flows through the area is more,benefits cover larger area,the water source of water diversion project stakeholders type and quantity is more,its behavior impact on water quality than local stakeholders behavior impact on water quality.Therefore,the evolution of stakeholders’ behavior in the middle line of sustainable supply chain of water transfer project is analyzed,and the evolution law of stakeholders’ behavior in protecting water quality is discussed,so as to achieve the purpose of protecting water quality and improve the overall benefits from the three dimensions of society,economy and environment.This article obtains from the middle line of south-to-north water diversion project stakeholders,under the theory of sustainable supply chain model based on ecological compensation,sewage disposal,reservoir operation and management,such as basic point,through the questionnaire and expert interview method to identify the stakeholders and the characteristics of the behavior and heterogeneous stag on small world network capture game model to the behavior of the various stakeholders in the MATLAB simulation analysis on evolution.The results show that :(1)the government,enterprises and residents all show the phenomenon of "cluster evolution" based on their own bottom line principle.(2)The game income of the government,enterprises and residents has certain guidance for the choice of their initial strategy.(3)After many games for a long time,the main body of the game will eventually form a stable state to protect the water quality.(4)Bounded rationality is evolutionarily unbiased.(5)After the players of the game did not protect the water quality,the average density of partners who protected the water quality did not increase with the increase of income parameters.Finally,this paper puts forward some suggestions from the aspects of protecting water quality and reducing game cost.