| At present,the overall goal of deepening the reform comprehensively is to improve and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics,and to promote the modernization of the national governance system and capacity.On the one hand,the administrative behavior of local government is a direct expression of the use of public power,but there are improper government behaviors,such as collusion and blame avoidance in daily life.On the other hand,the life is full of a large number of special actions and rectification activities,involving wide range of fields and areas.Because of the ineffectiveness of conventional governance,the government began to use campaign-style governance.Campaign-style governance has gradually become the preference of local government due to its efficient and fast,and it has shown a normalization trend.However,collusion and blame avoidance also exist in the process of campaign-style governance,which affects the results of governance and violates the requirements of the governance modernization.This article takes the process of campaign-style governance as the background.Through analysis of collusion,blame avoidance and the change of collusion and blame avoidance,it provides an effective way to explore the choice of local government behavior preferences.And put forward suggestions to evade government collusion and blame avoidance in order to achieve the effectiveness and standardization of government administrative actions,and then achieve good social governance results.First of all,this paper makes domestic scholar’s research results which related with government behavior,collusion,blame avoidance and campaign-style governance After collecting and combing,this paper defines the core concept with integrating many views and combined with relevant theoretical knowledge,and illustrates the Principal-agent theory and Rational choice theory.Then this paper establishes a analysis framework.Secondly,take the city F as an example,describes the three stages of environmental governance: conventional governance,campaign-style governance,and campaign-style governance’s normalization.And explain the three types of government behavior throughout the process,and analyze the generation logic of collusion and blame avoidance behaviors of local governments.Thirdly,according to the background of the trend of normalization of campaign-style governance,a hypothesis is proposed: With the normalization of campaign-style governance,the preference behavior of local government gradually changes from collusion to blame avoidance.Then,it analyzes the main reasons for this change: the developmenttrend of the normalization of campaign-style governance provides situation,the perfect accountability system and supervision system provide regulation,and the risk consciousness of local government officials provides individual factors.Under the combined effects of factors such as situation,regulation,and individual choice,the collusion space has gradually narrowed,and local governments have turned to choosing blame avoidance behaviors.Finally,in order to reduce the negative effects caused by local government collusion and responsibility avoidance,according to the analysis framework established above,we propose improvement measures for local government misconduct.First,the local government’s administrative behavior should conform to the era background of the government’s good image,governing the country according to law,and modernization of governance;second,form a system specification through a perfect supervision and restriction system and fault tolerance mechanism;and finally guide local government staff to establish a correct concept of political achievements.Regulate local government administrative behaviors with a view to achieving governance goals to a higher degree,thereby providing strong support for the modernization of national governance. |
