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The Government's Counter-terrorist Optimization Decision-making Game Analysis To Protect Civilians

Posted on:2017-01-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2336330512975723Subject:quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States International terrorism,hostile forces at home and abroad,ethnic separatism and religious extremism poses a terrorist threat in China.In recent years a number of terrorist attacks at home,with overseas "east turkistan" terrorist organization to incite,osmosis,command and organize related.Cruelty,terrorist attack goal mainly is the innocent people,so governments in their fight with terrorists should actively change strategy to protect civilians in the region.Otherwise,once the scale of the war on terror and protracted,serious damage to the ordinary People's Daily life and will lead to a wide range of refugees.So it is the important content of countries to effectively protect people.This paper respectively uses the maximum minimum game and stark's model to focuse on how to effectively protect civilians and the cause of refugees from the perspective of game theory and optimization decision,and how to protect civilians,respectively discusses the limited resources and unlimited resources two kinds of situations.It not only provides the policies and measures for governments to protect civilians,at the same time shows why civilians become refugees,provides some policy suggestions for the government reasonably to crack down on terrorist.The main research work includes the following three points:First,this paper discussed the false target optimal setting problem under the situation of the government and terrorists with limited resources and the damage caused by terrorist attacks on the government.G Levitin,K Hausken paper(2007)studied the use of false target defense true target strategy problems,got the optimal settings of the false target number,analyzed the factors affecting the number of false targets,in G Levitin,K Hausken articles,targets of the terrorist attack can be simply divided into true goals and false target two types,this paper combines with the specific environment on the basis of the false target strategy and the targets of the terrorist attack are divided into police officers,agents and civilians three types,this part is divided into five sections,the first section analyzes the number of terrorist attacks on the police,because the police are easy to identify in the crowd,so for the police there is no false target.The second quarter,from the perspective of the government,analyzes the terrorist attacks on civilians,the optimal number of agents as a false target and the number of terrorist attacks.The third quarter,from the perspective of the terrorists,analyzes the terrorist attacks on civilians to the actual loss caused by the government.The fourth quarter,from the perspective of the terrorists,analyzed the terrorist attacks mistake on agents to the actual loss caused by the government.Section 5 compares the third part and the fourth part,it is concluded that the terrorists attacks on civilians accurately for the loss caused by the government is far greater than the loss caused by terrorist attacks mistake on agent to the government and its established conditions are obtained.Second,on the basis of the above discussion further discusses the government and the terrorist resources infinite optimal setting problem of false target and the damage caused by terrorist attacks on the government.In the first part,assuming that both the government and the terrorists resources are limited,this part on the basis of the above studies assume that the government and the terrorist have unlimited resources,like when resources are limited,this part is divided into five sections,the first section analyzes the number of terrorist attacks on the police.The second quarter,from the perspective of the government,the paper analyzes the terrorist attacks on civilians,the optimal number of agents as a false target and the number of terrorist attacks.The third quarter,from the perspective of the terrorists,analyzes the terrorist attacks on civilians to the actual loss caused by the government.The fourth quarter,from the perspective of the terrorists,analyzes the terrorist attacks mistake on agents to the actual loss caused by the government.Section 5 compares the analysis results of the third quarter and the fourth quarter and come to the conclusion that the mixed agent in the crowd has certain protective effect on civilians.Third,this part which uses the Stackelberg model analyzes the government first action after terrorists battle strategy equilibrium.The main reference of this part is K Hausken and Zhuang J two articles,this section extends the original model on the basis of the stark's original,introduces the civilians of terrorists region,further explains the causes of the refugees,and carries on the numerical analysis combined with the concrete case.Finally,this part analyzes the independent repeat stark's model.
Keywords/Search Tags:Game theory, false target, maximum minimum game, Stackelberg model, refugees, terrorism
PDF Full Text Request
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