Research On The Game Of Investment Subject Under Social Capital Participating In The Construction Of Comprehensive Land Consolidation Project

The comprehensive land consolidation project is an important measure to adapt to the development of China,and the participation of social capital is of great significance to promote the development of the project.This study uses evolutionary game theory method to investigate the game between government and social capital,establishes an evolutionary game model,and uses system dynamics method to conduct simulation verification.Finally,through case study,the game process between government and social capital is simulated in a real scene of comprehensive land consolidation project.First of all,through the reform and development process of rural land in China,a clear global land comprehensive improvement project content and innovation points from the traditional land management,sums up such projects existing sources of funding,social capital to participate in such a common mode of operation of the project,analysis of social capital to participate in the benefit of the whole land comprehensive improvement project construction field changes,Laid the background foundation of the game between government and social capital.Secondly,a two-party game payment matrix of government-social capital is constructed and an evolutionary game model is established.By solving the model,it is found that there is no equilibrium point in the model under the static punishment strategy.Therefore,by optimizing the model and introducing dynamic punishment strategy,it can be found that there is equilibrium point in the evolutionary game model when certain conditions are met.Under these conditions,the system dynamics model is established and simulated with Vensim PLE Version software.The verification shows that the two sides of government and social capital can reach the equilibrium point of evolutionary game after a period of time,and the equilibrium point is stable.It can be seen that when the government adopts the regulation mode of dynamic punishment,it can exert a strong constraint on social capital and improve the probability of responsible construction of social capital.Finally,using the established model,the game between government and social capital in A town of Wuxing District,Huzhou City.Based on the real data of the case,the parameters of the model are quantified and the system dynamics model is used to simulate.The results show that in the game between B company and Huzhou government,the government adopts dynamic punishment instead of static punishment to ensure that social capital can carry out project construction with a high probability of responsibility.This study has the following policy implications:When introducing social capital to participate in the construction of comprehensive land consolidation projects,local governments should optimize the current supervision mode and adopt dynamic supervision strategy to improve the probability of responsible construction of social capital,thus improving the quality of comprehensive land consolidation projects and increasing the social benefits of such projects.