Research On The Avoidance Of Moral Hazard In The Third-party Education Evaluation From The Perspective Of Reputation

In October 2020,the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the Overall Plan for Deepening the Reform of Education Evaluation in the New Era,which pointed out that it was necessary to "build an evaluation system with multiple participation of the government,schools and society,and improve the scientificity,professionalism and objectivity of education evaluation",thus forming the principal-agent relationship in education governance.With the realization of the relative separation of education evaluation management,running and evaluation rights,a new problem comes along,that is,the moral hazard of the thirdparty education evaluation.In the economic field,the risk governance research of "resolving the agency relationship caused by the separation of ownership and control" has long been produced.The same is true in education.As far as the current situation is concerned,risk research and governance in the field of education have not become a common research topic.In the period of social transformation,preventing and avoiding education risks is an important step to realize education reform,which has a close impact on all aspects of society.The power of education evaluation is gradually shifting from government monopoly to independent third-party education evaluation.For the government,universities and any subject of the society,the interest demands are different.Because of the information asymmetry,the bounded rationality of human,the complexity of external environment and other factors,the three parties of management,run and evaluation are easy to produce the moral hazard behavior for their own interests at the expense of others.For example,the president of a university exposed on the Internet in recent years revealed that once a ranking organization came to ask for "sponsorship",but was rejected by the school and a school received calls from some ranking organizations,hoping that the school would provide "sponsorship" in order to gain a rise in the ranking.It can be seen that the moral hazard problem of the third-party education evaluation is real,and seriously affects the fairness and impartiality of the evaluation,and then damages the normal operation of the "separation of management,run and evaluation" system.Therefore,from the perspective of "reputation" of implicit constraints,this paper further discusses the relationship between reputation and moral hazard on the basis of existing studies,aiming to explore the internal mechanism of moral hazard of reputation constraints in order to avoid moral hazard.By combing the research on the avoidance of moral hazard in education evaluation and the economic research on the avoidance of reputation risk,this paper introduces the reputation in economics into the field of education,and analyzes the avoidance of moral hazard in the third-party education evaluation with the theory of reputation.This paper analyzes the relationship between reputation and moral hazard through the case study of the third-party education evaluation A,mainly analyzes the status quo of A’s reputation and the possible performance of moral hazard.Then using the game theory tool to analyze the internal mechanism of reputation restraint moral hazard under the capital effect and reputation effect.Finally,based on the two effects of reputation,and starting from the third-party education evaluation itself,this paper puts forward specific measures to avoid moral hazard.The ultimate goal of avoiding moral hazard is reputation.The establishment of long-term expectation mechanism,the implementation of credible threat,the establishment of public information platform and reputation information files,the training of professional ethics of evaluators and the management of reputation crisis of evaluation institutions can effectively avoid moral hazard to a certain extent.