Research On Government Information Disclosure Strategy In Emergency Management

Government plays an important part in the emergency management.However,the current emergency response mechanisms for governments at all levels in our country are still flawed,especially in the crisis information publicity.As government acts as the main producer,manager and issuer of emergency crisis information,it is therefore of important theoretical and practical value of this thesis to explore the governments’ behavior strategies of crisis information publicity in emergency management,and is the deepening and improvement of emergency improvement theory.Underpinned by an evolutionary game perspective,this thesis is characterized by the research direction of government information publicity with the two levels of government as the game body.Based on the comprehensive consideration of government incentives,government penalties,regulatory costs,additional governance costs and other factors influencing governance,this thesis constructs an evolutionary game model of information publicity strategies between the two levels of government in emergency response mechanisms.Through theoretical analysis and computing,this thesis comes to an evolutionary stable strategy to support the governments’ decision making and thereby improve their level in major emergency management and ability in emergency information publicity.Still,by introducing the influence factor of media exposure,this thesis discusses the failure of lower-level governments making misreporting and upgrades the evolutionary game model of upper and lower governance with the participation of media to make the model more suitable for the real scenarios to better explain situations and support decision making.This thesis then probes into the governance path evolution of the upper and lower level of governments with media involved in response to major emergencies.With the case studies of COVID-19 pandemic and7.23 Wenzhou train collision accident,this thesis further analyzes the governance path of the upper and lower level of governments.The research results show that media exposure,incentives from the central government and upper-level governments have certain impact upon the selection of game strategy in the evolutionary game of the upper and lower level of governments with media participation.In particular,the lower-level governments would choose to publish crisis information under the extremely high media exposure.In other cases,by adjusting the incentives of central government and the upper-level governments,the two-level government strategies can be shifted towards a strong supervision – real report strategy or weak supervision – real report strategy.