Research On Social Groups' Evolutionary Game Of Public Crisis

The past two or three decades, China triggered public animal crises frequently, which endangered social stability and people's normal life.In the public animal crises there are tripartite evolutionary game of regulatory agencies, businesses and consumers, the behaviors of these three events, plays an important role in the development and evolution. So how to manage the public animal crisis, must begin from tripartite evolutionary game of regulatory agencies, enterprises and consumers.And found the rules and issues in the game.Then, which adverse effects of these three events'psychologies and behavioral decisions will be found in sudden public animal crises, by analyses the current public policies and the interests'requirement of social groups. On the macro and micro,found the social groups'balanced behaviors in the evolutionary game, in order to eliminate or reduce negative impacts in public crisis. Explored the suitable public policy to the crisis is the ultimate goal and significance in this study.The whole idea of this paper was use evolutionary game theory in case of Shanghai Songjiang river "dead pig" to analysis which factors influenced the regulatory agencies, businesses, consumers behaviors. On this basis, put forward proposals of these social groups' behaviors about public animal crises' management.