Design Of Multi-task Incentive Contract From The Perspective Of Government Regulation

Based on the theory of multi-task contract,this paper studies how the government can exert more power in the process of low-carbon economy construction.Contract theory,also known as principal-agent theory.Contract is a form of social agreement in which individuals or organizations create rights,obligations and social status for themselves through free agreement.It can be understood as "keeping one’s word".In the process of low-carbon economy construction,the government is the main participant and the initiator of this economic activity,so the government is the principal in the principal-agent process.In order to prevent moral hazard and reduce the negative effect of Information asymmetry on the actual output of the project,the government has designed the incentive and mechanism of contract and reward.As for the state of government intervention and regulation of market economy,Japanese economist Masu Uekusa defined this state as government regulation in The Economics of Micro-regulation.Regulation is an important function of government.With the development of economy and technology,there are many participants in economic activities,and the principal-agent relationship becomes more and more complex.It is necessary to design multi-task contract in the study of principal-agent relationship,because one principal-agent relationship can not describe the relationship among subjects in economic activities effectively.As for the government to encourage social subjects to make efforts to reduce carbon,we can start from the two aspects of reducing the consumption of residents and enterprises.From the perspective of residents,the greenhouse gas produced by automobile consumption of gasoline is the main cause of carbon emissions generated by residential consumption.The effective layout of charging piles for new energy vehicles is conducive to more consumers choosing new energy vehicles.In view of this,the second chapter of this paper takes charging piles of new energy vehicles as the main body and studies the government’s regulation of charging pile manufacturers to put charging piles and recycle waste charging piles.From the perspective of enterprises,greenhouse gases generated by the use of carbon-containing energy in the production of enterprises are the main cause of carbon emissions.Due to the difference of enterprises’ own situation and different industries,different carbon reduction paths should be adopted for each enterprise.In view of this,chapter 3 establishes a multi-task incentive contract between the central government,the local government and the enterprises that produce carbon emissions.Considering the actual situation of enterprises,the government gives personalized incentives to enterprises to make efforts to save energy and reduce emissions by using clean energy and replacing production equipment.Because people’s behavior in the principal-agent process is characterized by bounded rationality,this paper studies the principal-agent problem in continuous time based on incomplete contract theory.Firstly,this paper analyzes the role of government regulation in the construction of low-carbon economy,introduces the status quo of the construction of the new intelligent automobile charging pile and the present situation of the recycling of the waste intelligent automobile charging pile,and the importance of governments at all levels to set individual carbon reduction targets for enterprises.The research status of government regulation,smart car charging pile,carbon neutralization and principal-agent theory is summarized,on this basis,the significance of the multi-task optimal incentive contract model on smart car charging pile and low-carbon development of enterprises under the perspective of government regulation is obtained.Secondly,this paper establishes the multi-task optimal incentive contract model for the principal-agent relationship between the government,the public and the enterprise.Then,comparing the incentive effect of the public and the government on the enterprises in the cooperative state and the non-cooperative state,it is found that the incentive effect of non-cooperation between the public and the government can not reach the optimal state because of the Information asymmetry between the two clients.Governments should work with the public to incentivize producers.Finally,this paper uses Matlab software to simulate the model under the state of cooperation between the government and the public.According to the simulation results,countermeasures and suggestions are proposed from the perspective of government regulation for the deployment optimization and disposal of charging piles.Then,this paper studies the multi-task incentive contract of low-carbon development from the perspective of government regulation.Compared with the multi-task contract model from the perspective of resident,the multi-dimension of agent action is considered in the multi-task contract model from the perspective of firm.Taking government regulation as an example,this paper establishes a multi-task optimal incentive contract model for central government,local government and enterprises under the multi-dimension of agent action.The study finds that the incentive effect of local government on enterprises,it will be influenced by the central government’s incentive intensity to local government,Enterprise’s risk aversion degree,Enterprise’s external environment,Enterprise’s cost of accepting task,enterprise’s comprehensive level and the stability of comprehensive level.Finally,on the basis of the simulation with Matlab software,the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions from the perspective of government regulation.And finally,this paper sums up the full text and looks forward to the future research of this topic.