Research On The Influence Of Non-state-owned Shareholder Governance On The Performance Of Competitive State-owned Enterprises

The Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee proposed to develop mixed reform,with classification mixed reform as the focus,and competitive state-owned enterprises as the pacesetter.Introducing non-state-owned shareholders is one of the ways of mixed reform.Can non-state-owned shareholder governance improve the performance of competitive state-owned enterprises? Is there a big difference between competing state-owned companies at different levels and regions?What is the impact of local government intervention? These are the problems in the new phase of reform of state-owned enterprises.This paper examines these issues.As the industry competition faced by competitive state-owned enterprises is more intense,and their social responsibilities are relatively light,the best way to improve the their competitiveness is introduce non-state-owned shareholders.This paper discusses the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the operating performance of such enterprises from the two dimensions of property right structure and high-level governance.Firstly,this paper lays a theoretical foundation.Secondly,this paper analyzes with the company,whose non-state owned shareholder governance is better.Then,taking the competitive state-owned enterprises as the research object,this paper studies through the fixed effect model.Finally,the effect of internal and external heterogeneity is further investigated.This paper draws the following conclusions:(1)non-state-owned shareholder governance improves the operating performance of competitive state-owned enterprises through ownership structure and high-level governance.(2)The two dimensions of non-state-owned shareholder governance have different effectiveness for competitive state-owned enterprises at different levels.(3)Non-state-owned shareholders governance plays an important role in improving the operational performance of competitive state-owned enterprises in regions with a low level of marketing.(4)local government intervention may curb the influence of non-stateowned shareholders in governance.