Research On Green Building Supply Chain Dynamic Decision-Making Considering The Government Subsidy

The building industry is the main industry that consumes energy and causes environmental pollution at present.As one of the solutions to reduce building energy consumption and building waste,green building(GB)needs to be urgently promoted in order to achieve sustainable development.On the one hand,with the increasing of consumers’ environmental awareness and the increasingly strict government environmental policies,many building enterprises are transitioning towards a green economy.However,the development of GB in China is still in its infancy,with high initial investment costs,which hinders the enthusiasm of enterprises to implement green behavior.Therefore,the government needs to provide reasonable subsidies to construction enterprises to stimulate their green behavior.On the other hand,the green behavior decisions of enterprises will be jointly influenced by the decisions of both upstream and downstream enterprises,and it is necessary for all nodes of the green building supply chain(GBSC)to cooperate closely through contracts to promote the development of GB.This paper is based on the current development status of China’s GBSC and GB market,drawing on domestic and foreign literature and practical experience about government subsidies and green behavior decision-making in the GBSC,and using theoretical methods such as contract design,differential game and optimal control to carry out research.Taking the lag effect of enterprise decision-making and the longterm dynamic practical problems in the operation process of GB supply chain into consideration,the author explores the green behavior decision-making issue of green supply chain under government subsidies from the long-term dynamic perspective.The results provide theoretical basis for the scientific formulation of government subsidies for GB and the green behavior practice of construction enterprises.The main contents of this paper are as follows.(1)This paper probes into the decision-making issues of cooperative energy conservation and publicity among members of the GBSC under government subsidies.The government is used as a game participant to establish differential game models composed of a single developer and a single supplier.This paper explores and compares the optimal equilibrium results of suppliers,developers,and the government under three decentralized decisions: centralized,no cost-sharing,and one-side cost-sharing contracts(developer sharing supplier energy-saving cost contracts)with or without government subsidies,and further explores the interaction between the government and members of GBSC.The results show that when there is no government subsidy,the introduction of one-side cost-sharing contracts under certain conditions can enhance GB energy-saving,GB goodwill,and improve the profits of GBSC members.And the introduction of government subsidies can effectively regulate the profit distribution of GBSC.(2)This paper probes into the green behavior decision-making of GBSC members under different subsidy mechanisms,constructs GBSC differential game models composed of a single developer and a single supplier under three modes of without government participation,government lump-sum subsidy and government subsidy based on unit area.GB cost-sharing contract is designed in which developers assume a portion of suppliers’ cost,trajectories of GBSC members’ green behavior efforts and GB prices change over time are explored,GB green-degree,GB goodwill,GBSC benefits under each model are also compared and analyzed.Research shows that the government subsidy based on unit area can better stimulate the development of GB.This paper explores the cooperative relationship among GBSC members,the incentive relationship between the government and enterprise members,and the green behavior decision-making of enterprises under government subsidies.Further combining the theoretical results with numerical analysis,this paper provides practical guidance and suggestions for the development of GB in China and the scientific formulation and implementation of government subsidies for GB.