| At present,the urban development of our country has entered an important period of urban renewal.The mode of large-scale incremental construction has turned to a mode of emphasizing both quality improvement of stock and incremental structural adjustment.When the speed of the urbanization process slows down,the number of new housing is decreasing year by year,and the housing in the past large-scale construction begins to aging year by year to become an old community as time goes by.The allocation of these old residential areas is difficult to meet the needs of contemporary residents,and most of them are located in the center of the city,resulting in greater difficulty in demolition for many reasons.Although the government has repeatedly mentioned that the old residential areas can be rebuilt without large-scale demolition and construction,the large number of old residential areas cannot be supported by limited local finance.By virtue of the advantages of PPP model,such as cooperation,risk sharing and benefit sharing,PPP model is gradually known in the academic circle and the society.However,due to the lack of laws and regulations and supporting mechanisms,large investment risks,fragmented reconstruction characteristics and multi-interest conflicts,the willingness of social capital to participate in the process of work is low,which restricts the promotion of the renovation practice of old PPP residential areas.Therefore,it is of great importance to analyze the influencing factors of PPP model in the reconstruction of old residential areas,balance and coordinate the interest relationship of participants,and carry out strategic research to promote the extensive application of PPP model in the reconstruction of old residential areas.This paper takes the reconstruction of old residential areas as the research object and starts from the perspective of PPP model.Firstly,it summarizes the domestic and foreign research status of urban renewal,PPP model and reconstruction of old residential areas,expounds related concepts and theoretical basis,and discusses the definition of main participants.Secondly,through literature research,case analysis and expert interview,the influencing factors were sorted out,and 19 influencing factors were determined after modification and optimization.The logical relationship and hierarchical relationship between influencing factors were determined by ISM-MICMAC analysis method,and the driving force and dependence of each factor were analyzed.Three final influencing factors were determined as the degree of government attention,the willingness of enterprises to participate and the willingness of residents to support.Then,in order to explore the degree of interference of other variables on the final influencing factors,on the basis of evolutionary game theory and MATLAB,an evolutionary game model is established and numerical simulation analysis is carried out for the three parties involved in the influencing factors,namely local government,social capital and residents of old residential areas.The influence of evolutionary equilibrium points and related parameters on the system evolution path is discussed.Finally,taking 2 old residential districts in Zibo city as examples,combining model analysis results with actual cases,corresponding transformation suggestions are put forward from the perspective of stakeholders,and three improvement strategies are put forward based on the previous research,in order to solve the problem of landing the successful project of the old residential district PPP model transformation.In this paper,through the research on the factors that affect the progress of the renovation of the old residential areas in the PPP model and the strategic behavior of the participants,the following findings are made:1.The degree of attention of the government,the willingness of enterprises to participate and the willingness of residents to support are the final influencing factors with strong dependence.These factors will directly determine the success of the renovation project of the old residential areas under the PPP model,and should be used as intervention factors.2.When B1+C3+C5-C2-M1-M2>0,C6+L2+M1-C4-C5>0,B2+M2-C8>0,that is,the profit and loss(benefit-cost-loss)under strong government incentive is higher than that under weak incentive,the profit and loss of enterprises participating in investment is higher than that of non-participating investment,the support cost of residents is less than the incremental income of residents and the preferential policies given by the government to support residents.In this case,the three participants will actively promote the reconstruction of the old residential area,and the tripartite cooperation will eventually reach an idealized evolutionary equilibrium.Within a reasonable range,the loss C3when the government gives weak incentives,the subsidy M1and M2of the government for enterprises and residents,The penalty C5 imposed by the government on enterprises,the cost C4 for enterprises’participation in the reconstruction and the cost C8 for residents’support can promote the tripartite game system to reach a rational evolutionary equilibrium.It is hoped that this paper can provide some reference for related research and the standardization and long-term management of the old residential renovation. |