Research On Taihu Lake Fishing Quota System Based On Institutional Change Theory

Taihu Lake is one of the five major freshwater lakes in China with rich fishery resources and a long fishing history.The annual catch of Taihu Lake continued to rise from 2016 to 2019.In order to protect the aquatic biological resources of Taihu Lake and promote the effective improvement of the ecological environment of the waters,on October 1,2020,the Jiangsu Provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of Jiangsu Province revoked the fishing rights of Taihu Lake fishery producers according to law,withdrew their fishing licenses,and cancelled relevant certificates.This measure will also have problems such as waste of fishery resources,and it is not a long-term solution.To this end,by sorting out domestic and foreign literature,from the perspective of property rights system reform,this paper summarizes the evolution of the fishing supervision system in Taihu Lake,and based on the fishery management goals in the new era,builds a theoretical model of property rights efficiency,and designs fishing management for Taihu Lake fishery The system provides scientific advice.First of all,this paper introduces the research background and significance,and sorts out the research from the perspective of property rights efficiency,institutional design,ecological environment,economic benefits and institutional changes by consulting domestic and foreign literature.And make a brief introduction to the innovation of the article.The property rights theory,the efficiency theory and the system change theory were discussed,which provided a solid theoretical basis for the article to study the property rights system of the sustainable development of fishery resources in Taihu Lake.By sorting out the course of the change of the fishery resources management system in Taihu Lake,it analyzes the change mechanism of the fishery management system in Taihu Lake.Then,the efficiency and failure reasons of fishery supervision in Taihu Lake are discussed.Institutional change is a dynamic cyclical process,which is always from disequilibrium to equilibrium to disequilibrium.A system innovation cannot solve all problems once and for all.When a system innovation ends and the supply and demand of the system reach a state of equilibrium temporarily,the limitations of the system innovation will also exist together,which is also a sign of the system imbalance in the next stage.The emergence of new institutional innovations creates the preconditions for existence.Secondly,it studies the types of property rights and the definition of fishery property rights in Taihu Lake,and analyzes the relationship between the fishery supervision mode in Taihu Lake and the property rights of fishery resources.Different fishery supervision models have different impacts on property rights.The clearer the definition of property rights for fishery resources management,the more people will consciously find ways that are beneficial to themselves to make fishery resources more effectively used,and the allocation of fishery resources will have higher efficiency.By sorting out the practical gains and losses of the fishery quota system in Iceland,New Zealand and the United States,it provides a reference for the system design of Taihu Lake.In today’s international fisheries management,almost all developed countries have adopted the fishery quota system.However,the implementation in Taihu Lake still needs to be analyzed in combination with the local actual application conditions.Finally,it points out that the main factors affecting the efficiency of fishery property rights are the clarity of property rights,changes in social needs,the ability of the main body of property rights to exercise power,and the degree of government supervision.The efficiency of the property rights system depends on the comparison between the system benefits it can provide and the system costs.In order to reflect this relationship and make a comparison in a possible sense,the efficiency of fishery resources property rights is defined as the comparison between the benefits of implementing a certain fishery resource property rights system and the cost of formulating and running the property rights system.According to the definition of property rights efficiency,the property rights efficiency of marine fishery resources assets is formulated and a theoretical model of property rights efficiency is constructed.It can be seen that the maximization of property rights efficiency is actually a problem of maximizing the benefits minus the cost of a certain fishery resource property rights system.When the benefits under the property rights system are large enough and the costs under the property rights system are small enough,the property rights efficiency reaches the maximum value,but this is often not the case in reality.It is for this reason that discussions of the benefits and costs of property rights are possible and meaningful.In addition,there is a constraint that the benefits minus costs under a certain property rights system must be greater than or at least equal to the existing social welfare level.The economic significance is obvious,and people will not support an inefficient property rights system.According to the goal of fishery management in Taihu Lake under the background of the new era,this paper analyzes the efficiency path of property rights evolution,which mainly includes the transformation of Taihu Lake fishery system and the precise assessment,the combination of government and market in total fishery catch,and the improvement of the supervision of Taihu fishery management department;The design of the property rights system of fishery resources should follow the five principles of rationality,legitimacy,reality,clear boundary definition,and ecological priority.On this basis,two development directions are proposed.One is to allocate the fishing rights of fishery resources to state-owned fishing companies from the perspective of supervision cost;The right to trade with 3-5 fishing companies,giving certain flexibility to institutional arrangements.The company that obtains the share of fishing becomes the subject of property rights and can carry out fishing in accordance with regulations.The internal incentive structure of fishery has been fundamentally changed,which is expected to achieve the goal of ecological protection of Taihu Lake and promote the sustainable development of fishery resources.