| Along with the emerging of service economy,service quality guarantee has become the focus of enterprises.This strategy can not only effectively stimulates market demand,but also reduces supply chain management difficulty by clarifying the responsibilities of service supply chain members.However,the market environment is changeable.Once the unexpected events interfere with the market demand or the cost of node enterprises,the original quality guarantee decision-making and coordination strategy of the supply chain can not ensure that the performance is still in the optimal state.Therefore,it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the decision-making and coordination of service supply chain quality guarantee in the case of disruption.Based on this,we build a service supply chain model that considers quality guarantee under stable environment,demand disruption,and integrator’s cost disruption.The chain model and game theory-related methods are used to obtain the optimal quality guarantee level,and the optimal pricing decision when different decision modes are adopted in the three cases.The optimal solutions before and after the demand disruption and the cost disruption are compared and analyzed respectively.In addition,we coordinate the service supply chain considering quality guarantee level in the decentralized decision mode through the revenue-sharing contract improved.The research shows that:(1)The corresponding service price,quality guarantee level,and service capacity change laws in centralized decision-making mode and decentralized decision-making mode are the same.When the positive demand disruption is big,then all three optimal solutions above increase;when the negative demand disruption is big,then all three optimal solutions above decrease.When the integrator’s cost is more disrupted,the service price increases,and the quality guarantee level and service capacity decrease;when the integrator’s cost is less disrupted,the service price decreases,the quality guarantee level and service capacity increase.if the demand disruption and the integrator’s cost disruption are both small,the quality guarantee level and service capacity are robust,and the service price is only robust to small integrator’ cost disruption.(2)Once the demand is disrupted,the integrator is willing to adjust the initial plan,while the provider is only willing to adjust when the demand is negatively disrupted.Once the integrator’s cost is disrupted,the integrator is only willing to adjust when the positive disruption is large,while the provider is only willing to adjust when the negative disruption is large.(3)in the centralized model,the supply chain profits increase when demand suddenly increases,and decrease when demand sharply decreases;the supply chain total profits decrease when the the integrator’s cost suddenly increases,and the supply chain total profits increase when the integrator’s cost sharply decreases.In the decentralized model,the change law of the integrator’s profit is the same as that of the centralized profits,while the provider’s profit is robust when the disruption is small.(4)Revenue-sharing contract can effectively coordinate the service supply chain which consider quality guarantee in three environments and achieve Pareto optimality.Demand surges and the revenue-sharing coefficient increases;demand decreases sharply,and the revenue-sharing coefficient decreases first and then increases.The integrator’s cost suddenly increases,and the revenue-sharing coefficient also decreases first and then increases;The integrator’s cost sharply decreases,and the revenue-sharing coefficient increases.This research can provide reference and theoretical support for coping strategies of quality guarantee and service price in service supply chain when facing demand disruption and integrator’s cost disruption,so as to ensure that the decision makers of service supply chain can adopt the best strategies to deal with emergencies. |