Research On The Subsidy Mechanism Of Institutional Elderly Care Services In China

Elderly care institutions aim to provide professional life care,medical care,spiritual comfort and other services for the elderly.It has become a choice for more and more elderly people to stay in elderly care institutions to receive services.China’s elderly care service market is far from mature.As a provider of institutional elderly care services,elderly care institutions are facing greater financial pressure in the process of development.As a recipient of services,although the elderly have high service demand,their ability to pay is weak,so they can not afford higher institutional elderly care service costs.The government provides subsidies for the elderly and elderly care institutions to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand of institutional elderly care services to a certain extent.However,due to the influence of various factors,the current subsidy system has many shortcomings,and its core is that a relatively reasonable and effective subsidy mechanism has not yet been formed.Therefore,it is also necessary to further analyze the problems existing in the current institutional pension service subsidy mechanism,actively explore the reasons behind it,seek ideas to optimize and improve the institutional pension service subsidy mechanism,and put forward effective policy measures and suggestions.This paper focuses on the optimization and improvement of the subsidy mechanism for institutional elderly care services in China.First of all,using public goods theory,government failure theory,voluntary failure theory and mechanism design theory,this paper explores the theoretical rationality of subsidies for institutional elderly care services and the possibility of optimizing the subsidy mechanism;Secondly,it comprehensively combs the subsidy status of institutional elderly care services in China,and deeply analyzes the problems and reasons of the subsidy mechanism of institutional elderly care services in China;Finally,it summarizes and draws lessons from the relevant experience of foreign subsidy mechanisms,constructs the optimization model of China’s institutional pension service subsidy mechanism,puts forward the basic ideas and basic principles to improve China’s institutional pension service subsidy mechanism,further optimizes the service subsidy operation mechanism and security mechanism,and realizes the healthy and sustainable development of the institutional pension service market.The research of this paper shows that:(1)in just 10 years,various regions have adhered to the basic principle of acting according to their ability and doing their best,and initially established the subsidy system for institutional elderly care services,which has played a very positive role in promoting the development of elderly care institutions.At present,it is gradually developing in the direction of refinement;(2)In practice,China’s institutional pension service subsidies are faced with problems such as fragmented subsidy system,uneven distribution of subsidy resources,insufficient subsidy differentiation,low subsidy level,unscientific subsidy payment and lack of effective supervision.The main reasons are the constraints of realistic conditions,the subsidies are in the initial stage of development,the government’s responsibility positioning is unclear,and the information collection and transmission mechanism is not perfect,There is an urgent need to optimize the design of China’s institutional pension service subsidy mechanism;(3)The optimization of the subsidy mechanism needs systematic thinking.It comprehensively optimizes the design of institutional pension service subsidies in China from the perspective of subsidy ideas,subsidy principles,subsidy operation mechanism and subsidy system guarantee.