Research Of State-owned Assets Supervisory Model Based On Evolutionary Game

Public ownership economy is one of the basic features of the socialist system. It is an important foundation of our economy and support. As an important component of the public economy, the state-owned economy is in a dominant position of the national economy, controlling the lifeblood of the national economy, playing a supporting, guiding and leading role for the development of the whole economy and society. Therefore, supervision and administration of the state-owned assets will help improve the quality and competitiveness of state-owned economy, promote the optimal allocation of state assets, thus have a far-reaching significance in preventing loss of state assets and promoting the value of state-owned assets. But the relationships in supervision of local state-owned assets in our country has not been straightened out, and the local state-owned assets supervision is still at a preliminary stage remain exploration, both academically and industrially. In view of this, based on state-owned assets supervision mode in the past,, the paper deeply analyzes the reform of supervision of state-owned assets mode and its effect using evolutionary game theory, difference-in-differences model and other qualitative or quantitative research methods. The paper ends by giving several feasible suggestions to the reform of supervision of state-owned assets mode based on the successful management from foreign experience.Factors paper uses evolutionary game theory, the interactive process of state-owned assets supervision during the trustor and the Agency and the process to be modeled by simulating the deduction solving and Nash equilibrium analysis, to explore the transformation of state-owned assets supervision and mode of interaction mechanism and thus accurate positioning Henan State-owned Assets supervision focus mode. Combined with the results of the mathematical model, the use of relevant statistical data Henan, through the establishment of a double difference model, the effect of the specific mode of Henan Province, the reform of state-owned assets supervision and quantitative study. There are effective ways to explore the final regulatory assets from "In the management of assets-based" to "tube-based capital" into abroad, the results will help solve the drawbacks of state-owned assets supervision mode, providing a powerful reference for state-owned enterprise assets supervision, help enhance the utilization of state-owned assets in order to better has important practical significance for the socialist market economy.The innovation of this paper is: first, the use of evolutionary game theory, bounded rationality based on the participants to construct the state-owned enterprises, evolutionary game model regulators to participate in the analysis of both players under conditions of bounded rationality, how to continue strategies and actions to optimize the final equilibrium state, in order to determine the focus of state-owned assets supervision and improved mode; Second, in order to Henan Province state-owned asset management platform, for example, double difference method(Difference in Difference Method) empirical study of the state-owned assets supervision and mode of policy reform measures results; Interaction term split third, after making reference regression analysis, the reaction Mode Reform of state-owned assets supervision and thus any effect of the reform on the sample period of a year in which to inspect, and ultimately determine the validity of the State-owned Assets Supervision Mode.