From "People's Democracy" To The Establishment Of "Para-Stalinist System"

Czechoslovakia's evolution from "people's democracy" to "total sovietalization" in 1940s and 1950s, actually coincide with changes of Soviet's foreign strategy and its Eastern-European policies in that time. In the specifical days. This evolution was the result of Soviet military and political existence in Czech, and to some extent influenced by Czech's domestic elements such as lessons from "Munich plot" and war suffering in the WWII impact, and so on. In this process, Czech Communist Party acted as the agent of Soviet policies in Czech, and as returns in domestically political struggles won Soviet supports.Based on first hand sources, this thesis focuses on the connection between Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe and Czech's historical evolution in the early years of post-war period, in order to further the understanding of cold war's impact on certain countries and areas. This thesis was composed of five parts.The first chapter firstly compares Stalin and Edvard Bene(s|ˇ)' attitude towards national security and democracy, then demonstrates how the commonplaces between their ideas bring them togher. Bene(s|ˇ) defined Czech's security as "the bridge between East and West" and democracy as a third road with the combination of virtues of Soviet democracy and liberty democracy. This definition partly fitted into Stalin's view on Soviet national security - "boundary and influences sphere" and was regarded by Stalin as the best way for his policies towards post-war Eastern Europe. This similarity between two leaders' ideas finally led to the formation of the Soviet-Czechoslovakia Pact in 1943. On the other hand, Stalin used the powerful Czech Communist Party armed with army and masses, which resulted from its active role in resisting occupation in the WWII, as a strong limit on Bene(s|ˇ).In the connection with the origin of "people's democracy", Chapter Two explores how and what about Stalin's policy of controlling Eastern Europe - "coalition government"- in the case of Czech. As the product of great powers' compromise by the end of WWII, coalition government became Stalin's target to transform into people's democracy. In latter, the coalition government dominated by communist party, different economic elements co-existed, and friendly towards Soviet. This people's democracy is "coordinated democracy" rooted in the anti-Fascist Allies cooperation, and was doomed to be over when great powers went to confrontation.Chapter Three discusses the relationship between Soviet's reaction to Marshall Plan and economic development of Czech, on the background of Stalin's policy of post-war great powers cooperation. In 1947, Marshall Plan was the turning point of Soviet-American relationship and made Stalin decided to stop previous Soviet-American cooperation. Stalin refused the Marshall Plan and forced Eastern Europe to reject the Paris Meeting on Marshall Plan. In Czech case, even though the government made the decision to attend the Paris Meeting under the persuasion of non-communists officials, it had to submit to the serious Stalin's ultimatum in Soviet-Czech bilateral negotiation in January 1947 and give up the idea of joining Marshall Plan. With the cut down of the commercial ties with western countries, Czech Communist Party succeeded in put its idea into reality - trading with Soviet and Slavic countries and developing with planned economy, and thus created conditions for transplanting Soviet economic model into Czech.Beginning with the reasons why Stalin gave up great powers' cooperation, Chapter Four explores the connection between the establishment of the Communist Intelligence Bureau and the formation of Soviet cold war strategy. In the establishing conference of the Communist Intelligence Bureau, Zhdanov claimed the theory of "camp confrontation", and after the critics toward to communist parties in France and Italy directed Eastern European communist parties to seize the power with force. Communist parties in East Europe revised their policy according to Zhadanov's direction and finished the task of power seizure. Czech communist party lagged behind in this process, because their success in 1946 congressional election made them confident in parliamentary struggle and estimated another success in 1948 election. Only faced the impossibility of success in election and the government crisis made by non-communist elements, Czech Communist Party had to seize the power with force under the supervision and encouragement of Vice Foreign Minister Zorin. The event in February 1948 led to the final settlement of "who beat down who", and made possible to transplant the Soviet political model into Czech.With the description of the establishment of Soviet model in Czechoslovakia, Chapter Five examines who and how transplant the Soviet model into Czech and following influences on Czech's society. According to Stalin's view, the class struggle would be more acute during the socialist transformation period, and the purge of representatives with the mind of "nationalist road towards socialism" is a precondition for such transplantation. In this transformation, a political force grown up who followed Moscow's line and advocated the institutional transplantation. With the method of suppression and purge, Stalinist model and systems were stabilized, and Soviet gained control over Eastern Europe by cadre replacement. In the international economic system of socialist world, Czech was placed at the position of socialist "machine tool plant", and the priority of heavy industry led to the imbalance of national economy. By 1953, Soviet model was established in Czech, and its dilemma also gradually became clear.