Research On Governance Model And Operating Mechanisms Of Service Outsourcing

Service outsourcing is a new industrial organization model, relying on modern information technology, and developed in economic globalization. Technological innovation and information revolution make it possible to separate service products production from consumption. The separation endues service products with cross-regional tradability. As production of service products can be cross-regional ly allocated based on regional comparative advantages, the overall competitiveness of enterprises could be enhanced. As outsourcing market matures, and technology-knowledge-intensive projects takes an increasing proportion in the service outsourcing, the simple employment relationship between contractor and contractee develops into a new strategic partnership of cooperation. While scholars at home and abroad emphasis on the macro-perspective analysis in service outsourcing research, this paper is based on micro-perspective, and revealing the general rules in service outsourcing organization, by portraying the behavior of both contractor and contractee in the interactive game.Firstly, this paper answers the question of "WHAT is service outsourcing organization". By comparing 3 kinds institutional forms, market, firm and outsourcing, the nature of service outsourcing organization is defined as relational-contract-based bilateral governance.Then, another question merges, "WHY service outsourcing organization exists" By defining the nature of service outsourcing organization and analyzing its governance structure from the perspective of human capital and access theory, the core governance mechanism of service outsourcing is concluded, in which the contractors open up the access rights to critical resources to motivate the contractee to take corresponding specific investment in human capital. This governance model takes advantages in knowledge-human-intensive service transactions. It also explains the development of service outsourcing industry.However, "HOW service outsourcing organization operates" remains undiscovered. This paper explores the operation in the following areas, multitask incentives, decision-making mechanism, and knowledge sharing in service outsourcing.The innovation of this paper is mainly: (1)This paper proposes service outsourcing contract characteristics and governance model. Based on institutional economics transaction cost analysis and the comparing the institutional forms of market, firm and outsourcing, the nature of service outsourcing organization is defined as relational-contract-based bilateral governance.(2)This paper reveals the core mechanism of service outsourcing governance, and constructs incomplete contract model with asymmetric information in both static and dynamic aspects, which is based on the access rights and reputation mechanism. The core governance mechanism of service outsourcing is concluded, in which the contractors open up the access rights to critical resources to motivate the contractee to take corresponding specific investment in human capital. The model demonstrates that in one-off game (under static condition) service outsourcing organizations could reach suboptimal level of investment incentives, but could not archive social optimal investment incentives. The model also demonstrates that in repeated game (under dynamic condition) the equilibrium state, in which both sides could reach social optimization, could be achieved, under the effect of the reputation mechanism.(3)This paper established multitask incentive model in service outsourcing. Considering that service outsourcing is featured in multitask, low accountability and high relevancy, and defining the optimal contract design constraint condition, multitask incentive model is established, based on classic salary motivation model. The model also includes incentive mechanism design of different tasks.(4)This paper established decision-making model in service outsourcing. Since service outsourcing is marked by uncertainty, the risk estimates and third-party supervision fee is added to construct the decision-making model from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis. Considering to outsourcing decision-makers preferences, the model could provide an optimal decision scheme.(5)This paper established knowledge-sharing model in service outsourcing. The evolutionary-game model shows the internal mechanisms and dynamic evolution process of knowledge-sharing, and also points out the relation between evolution process, equilibrium point, pay-off matrix and parametric.