A Study On Incentive Coordination Models In Construction Supply Chain Integration Management

With respect to research object of domestic large-scale infrastructure construction projects, by generally applying supply chain management thoughts, incentive theory, operation research, econometrics, game theory and information economics and some other methods for system optimization and decision-making modelling, theoretical framework of construction supply chain integration management was analyzed qualitatively. Furthermore, from perspective of incentive coordination, coordination mechanisms and decision methods of construction supply chain in environment of integrated project management were studied through quantitative modelling; some effective coordination management tactics for the main project participants/parties of construction supply chain were obtained through solving and analyzing the models. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:Essence of the supply chain was analyzed and concept of the supply chain was extended firstly. Then, by comparative analysis of industry environment, market management system and large-scale infrastructure construction projects management mode of the construction industry in domestic and overseas, a viewpoint that the Project Corporation should be the core member of construction supply chain was presented. Then, a net-chain structure of construction supply chain and an integrated elements framework of construction supply chain integration management were constructed from project's life cycle perspective. Considering different organizational relationship levels and integration levels, based on staggered characteristics of supply chain integration in strategic level and hierarchical relations & spired advancing process of integrated elements in operational level, the basic alliance constructing process and an integrated operation framework model of construction supply chain were presented, corresponding operation thoughts and internal factors of coordination mechanisms were analyzed.From perspective of the Project Corporation and the contractor in the construction supply chain, optimization problem of project duration coordination decision-making between the Project Corporation and one contractor through explicit revenue incentive contract was considered; a Stackelberg revenue incentive contract model with the Project Corporation as the leader and the contractor as the follower was set up based on the game theory and bi-level programming method. Backward induction was applied and corresponding genetic algorithms was designed to solve subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the nonlinear programming model. Combining with a Numerical study, sensitivities of relative factors influencing the approximate optimal equilibrium solution were analyzed. The research results showed that the revenue incentive mechanism can help to actualize coordination optimization of project duration and Pareto improvement of revenue object for the two parties in contract.Furthermore, based on the incentive theory and principal agent model, a revenue incentive model for multi-objects (project duration and quality) coordination equilibrium improvement between the Project Corporation and the contractor was constructed and solved by the first-order approach. The research results showed that, the contractor can be promoted to improve its effort level and to allocate its resources rationally in multi-objects so as to realize coordination equilibrium improvement among the multi-objects through providing a balanced incentive combination. A numerical study also testified validity of the model. Finally, a two-stage dynamic revenue incentive model was put forward through an extended study.Based on the whole market environment of the construction industry, considering with the long-term mechanism and implicit reputation incentive factor, a two-stage dynamic incentive contract model integrating the implicit reputation incentive mechanism with the explicit revenue incentive mechanism was established. Conditions of effective equilibrium and Pareto improvement of the reputation incentive mechanism were obtained. Through a numerical study, factors influencing effect of the reputation incentive mechanism were analyzed. Thereafter, some conclusions were generalized to an undated situation; existence of implicit reputation incentive mechanism and its incentive effect to the agents in the construction industry market were discussed.