Study On Land Conflict In The Process Of Expropriation

Lots of land is converted from agricultural use to non-agricultural use by expropriation in the process of the fueling urbanization in contemporary China. Because of rural land expropriation, the adjustment of land rights and interests led to land conflict incidents and landless farmers. But the solution or harmonious mechanism for land conflict has not been built up, and if China continues adopting urbanization strategy in the future, rural land conflict would replay more and more heatedly. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the theoretical and systemic measures to effectively resolve rural land conflict.Based on outcomes of the existing research on land conflict abroad and home, the thinking and methodology of the foreign research is renewed to apply for China's factual land conflict situation in the paper. After the related conceptions and theories are introduced, the frame of the paper is set up like this: the first section is to anatomize causes inducing conflict in the process of land expropriation, the second is to explore the dynamics of land conflict, the third is to analyze and simulate game process of land conflict, the fourth is to construct harmonious mechanism of land conflict, and the last is to make clear conclusion and discussion.1. The causes inducing land conflict. Induced causes make land conflict happen possible in the process of land expropriation. The induced causes generally come from law and institution, social environment, governmental organization and actors.2. The dynamics of land conflict. The conflicting dynamics, which arises out of the inconsistent utility of the same land for conflicting participants, explodes land conflict. As for local governmental official, they dynamically expropriate rural land in the interest of the two types of their utility: the first is the appreciable financial income, and the second is the un-computable promotion because of political achievement. At the same time, the two change positively with the quantity of the expropriated land. If the two is higher, the conflicting dynamics is more powerful. But then, as for the expropriated farmers, they dynamically strive for the risk after their contacting land is expropriated. Because groups of landless farmers stay in the diverse boats, their contest dynamics differs. Landless farmers'conflicting dynamics come from the following:â‘ the utility as which they reckon the compensation they strive for according to their risk situation;â‘¡the expected compensation that they strive for under uncertainty;â‘¢the uncertainty that they have to strive in;â‘£the speculation that they contest by. To sum up, the utility function that governmental official expropriate land for counterchanges with the function as which they reckon the compensation they strive for. Namely, the conflicting dynamics relies on the two parties'utility function change. According to the conflicting dynamics change law, land expropriation policy is drawn up and implemented by the guide of Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Model. The model shows that Pareto improvement of land expropriation decision and policy decreases the conflicting dynamics between governmental officials and farmers in order to promote farmers'obedience and debase land conflict intensity.3. The game process of conflicting participants. Governmental officials and expropriated farmers are regarded as game players, and their bargaining process is simulated by extensive threat game model. Nash equilibrium solution in the model reveals:â‘ each party's land utility value and general social land utility diminishes as land conflict become more intense, which results in land waste;â‘¡the land utility share that one player get increases as the proportion of his conflict cost to benefit becomes large, and decreases as the proportion of counter-player's cost to benefit becomes large. Under the relative constant of general land benefit, if one party has more potential capacity to pay conflicting cost, he obtains more share of land benefit. In the bargaining course, both parties adopt aggressive strategies or defensive strategies to obtain their expected share on basis of their own judgement to counterparty's response. On account of this subjective asymmetrical information dynamical game, as asymmetrical boundedly rational players, governmental officials and landless farmers cognize each other and adjust their respective strategies by repeated interaction. On one hand, officials apply their strategies to control or appease landless farmers, on the other hand, landless farmers adopt their strategies to oppose or compromise with officials. Controlling and opposing strategies stimulate officials and farmers to conflict, and appeasing and compromising strategies make them to peace. However, when both types of strategies are applied need to be chosen by dint of the analysis of hawk-dove game model and replicator dynamics. The result in the model shows that the adopted strategies converge on the evolutional stable strategies. Furthermore, the evolutional stable strategies depend on the ratio of land utility value to conflicting cost.4. The harmonious mechanism of land conflict. The harmonious mechanism has to be constructed to decrease or harmonize land conflict only if the law and institution, social environment, governmental organization and parties'utility adapt each another. There is a great deal of the optional tactics of harmonizing land conflict including law and institution improvement, social environment transformation, governmental organization reform and game character adjustment, but law and institution improvement is the fundament of harmonious mechanism.5. Sum-up. The last section of the paper clarifies the conclusion, innovation and further issues.