Human Capital Pricing Problem Based On N-person Ordinal Cooperation Game Model

From static viewpoint, The human capital pricing problem could be decomposed two subproblems: (1) the pay grade structure between different level human capital. (2) when a person's pay is definite, how design the inner structure of the pay to motive a person to the most? This paper discusses the first subproblem.In present domestic research, there exists a methodology pitfalls that always trying to calculating absolute value of a person's human capital.But the fact is the value of a person's human capital is rather in a ever-changing state than in a stable state.So under such conditions, many hypothesis and assumptions have to be advanced to reach the calculation.The fault is that too many hypothesises often undermine practical merit of the calculation.A new approach is suggested in this paper, i.e.: a person's human capital features obvious grading status in a large group .According to this fact, we could measure a person's human capital in a quantitative way, and further resolve the human capital problems.Because a person cannot realizes his/her human capital in a isolated environment, there must be cooperation between peoples, so the realization of human capital is a cooperation game process.A cooperation game model could be advanced according to the unsure character of human capital, the model' definition is below: when the whole grand coalition income of all players is set, but the contribution of single player to grand coalition cannot or shouldnot be set individually, so how should the whole income be distributed among single player?The cooperation model definited as above is called 'N-person ordinal cooperation game model'.It is obvious that income distribution problems in college is an implementation in real life of N-person ordinal cooperation game model.The main content and struc of this paper is as following:Chap.1 reviews concisely on the history of humancapital theory, and suggests a new method for resolving human capital problem.Chap.2 reviews concisely on the history and status quo of cooperation game theory. Chap.3 suggests a value conception for N-person ordinal cooperation game model i.e. most simplest lexicographic value conception, MSL value conception.Chap.4,chap.5 test MSL value conception using econometric method and experimental economics method.Chap.6 discusses the efficiency of MSL value conception, and suggests a efficiency measurement indicator.Chap.7 looks back on the history of china's salary system reforms since 1949, and there are two shortcomings in recent reform of 2006, i.e.: too many position grades,shortage of objectivity of salary grade.Chap.8 uses N-person ordinal cooperation game model to discuss the two shortcomings in 2006 salary system reform, and gives some policy suggestions.Chap.9 discusses the more detailed ways to strength the tests of chap.5,6,8.Chap.10 sums up same main points of this paper on humancapital pricing problem.