Behavioral Analysis Of Stakeholders In Cultivated Land Protection During The Urbanization

Protecting cultivated land is protecting our lives. Protecting cultivated land in the process of urbanization is the fundamental avenue to actualize sustainable cultivated land use and healthy development of urbanization, the consciousness and behavior of the stakeholders in cultivated land protection during urbanization is crucial to cultivated land protection. Base on the theory of sustainable development,externalities and market failure,man-land relationship, we analyze the behavior of stakeholders in cultivated land protection during urbanization with the method of normative analysis,positive analysis,cases study and investigation. The purpose is to search the behavior decision-making mechanism of stakeholder in cultivated land protection during urbanization, then optimize the behavior.There four part in this paper, the first part make general analysis of cultivated land protection during urbanization from the angle of literature review,basic theory,definition,quantitative change of cultivated land and driving factor of farmland conversion; In order to search stakeholders behavior decision-making mechanism ,the second part give detailed discuss of stakeholders behavior from the angle of behavioral motivation,behavioral strategy,behavioral root and behavioral impact after clearly define the subject of cultivated land protection during urbanization; After make primary-secondary relationship and give the right and responsibility of stakeholders, the third part put forward coordination mechanism to rule and harmonize their behavior, then discuss the system arrangement transform and path choose of coordination mechanism; The fourth part is the final conclusion of the paper . we believe that the paper's integrity theoretic frame of stakeholders and their behavior of cultivated land protection during urbanization is a new ideas.After system analysis of stakeholders and their behaviors of cultivated land protection during urbanization, the paper makes the following conclusions:(1) Contrastive analysis of the cultivated land protection stakeholders during urbanization at home and abroad show that the subject in policy is single and the scope of cultivated land protection subject is excessive narrow. The successful experience abroad tells us that diversified subject and positive behavior of cultivated land protection is crucial to the success of cultivated land protection. However, the subject in policy only conclude government, farmer,countryside collective organization and land use unit are excluded, they only have the"obligation"to protect cultivated land, but in practice they lack the enthusiasm to protect cultivated land, plus the government failure and converse behavior, which lead to the omission of subject in practice.(2) After analyze central government behavior in the process of urbanization we find that a series of strategies were implemented by the central government, but among which there is"government failure". On one hand, in the process of high-speed urbanization the central government continuously improve the behavioral strategies of cultivated land protection from the aspects of policy,law and so on, such as implemented the strictest cultivated land protection institution and innovative use the land policy to regulate and control Marco-economy, it can be said that at present the central government has initially developed a relatively complete set of cultivated land protection policy framework,. On the other hand, there is"government failure"in government behavioral strategies, which show that central government cultivated land protection strategies can't supervise other subjects'behavior effectively which lead to lots of illegal land use behavior, and the strategies also can't encourage other subjects incentive to protect farmland. The reason of"government failure"has many aspects, firstly, diversified goal lead to the conflict of correlated cultivated land protection policy; secondly, over-administrative regulates make their behavior strategy violates their behavior motivation; thirdly, there is vulnerability in the cultivated land protection policy made by central government, which provide objective condition for the"converse behavior"of land offenders; At last, central government can't supervise local government behavior effectively because of the lack of monitoring and incentive mechanism in cultivated land protection principal-agent mechanism, which prick up local government risk consciousness of"converse behavior".(3) Statistics and cases study of local government behavior in the high-speed urbanization revealed that according the policy local government has reformed their duties of cultivated land protection to some extent, but there are lots of"converse behaviors". As the single cultivated land protection subject in policy, for establishment of local political local government required to carry out a series of acts of cultivated land protection strategy, such as carry out land arrangement and development and delimit basic cultivated land and so on. However, there are lots of"converse behaviors"in local government behavioral strategies, include illegal land grant and illegal land square, the purpose of local government mass land illegal behavior is to set politic achievement through land business. The vulnerability of system,structure and land supply mode is the"catalyst"of local government"converse behavior";And the foundation causes of local government"converse behavior"is to maximize their own interests through"land finance".(4) Statistical analysis and investigation of farmers and collective organization behavior in the process of urbanization shows that they lack consciousness of cultivated land protection, and cultivated land protection is the"incidental goods"of their behavioral strategies. Through the investigation of farmer cognition of cultivated land protection we find that farmer generally consider the necessary to protect cultivated land but few will carry into execution, because farmer chase maximum self-interest in land use, but they can't realize this goal in cultivated land protection which has positive externality. In addition, for political rural collective organization carried out some strategies to protect cultivated land, but for the high economic benefits of non-agriculture use of farm land, local government took lots of illegal land use behavior. We can say that cultivated land protection is the"incidental goods"of farmers and collective organization behavior to chase self-interest.(5) Statistical analysis of land use units'behavior in the process of urbanization shows that although the policy and regulation give the land use units"obligation"to protect cultivated land, however, the land use units lack consciousness of cultivated land protection and they are the main subject of land law in practice. In current, local government monopoly"the right of land supply"to sell expropriated land on high price through low compensation price,in order to reduce the acquisition cost the land use units is inclined to choose illegal land use; In addition, the purpose of land use units is to maximize their own interest in land use, however, now we still lack effective incentives to encourage land units protect land in land development, so the land unit will not pay the act of intensive land utilization.(6) Through the system analysis of medium-stakeholders and micro-stakeholders behavior of cultivated land protection during urbanization we have concluded that behaviors of medium-stakeholders and micro- stakeholders demonstrate characteristics of"rational economic man". So the central government must be make sure that the restraint mechanism of cultivated land protection made by them can encourage the subjects'incentive to protect cultivated land, which must enable the pay for subject behavior of land protection is more than the gains they get from not implementing the behavior, such as taking compensatory measures to internalization of externalities to encourage their initiative of protecting cultivated land. In addition, The future policy system should take the micro-subject into the scope of cultivated land protection subject,change"obligation"for"responsibility"to enhance their sense of responsibility to protect cultivated land.(7) It is a system engineering to regulate and inspirit cultivated land protection subject incentive to protect cultivated land. In the process of urbanization, the conflict of stakeholder behavior has lots of causes, such as system,structure and mode of land supply, the subject and their behavior is interacted and mutual to each other. Therefore, in order to regulate and inspirit subject's behavior of land protection, firstly, we should tidy up the primary-secondary relationship of the subject to prevent the conflict of subject behavior; secondly, give overall condition and reform the system,structure,mechanism and so on at the same time.