| From the perspective of political science, to study the democratic transition anddemocratic quality under governance dimensions has become a new trend in theresearches of academic circles. The legitimacy implication of democratic politicalsystem is not only reflected in the dimensions such as pluralistic competition and freeelections, but also reflected in whether the operation of political democracy system canpromote a good national governance performance. To achieve good governanceperformance means the establishment of “responsibility”,“transparency” and“response” decision-making mechanism in the process of policy making so as toguarantee the social members enjoy the equal rights and opportunities to participate inand influence policy, and fairly and reasonably take care of the interests of differentsocial groups and classes on the decision results. In this sense, the structural elements ofdecision-making mechanism and democratization, scientific and degree of the rule oflaw in the process of the operation are important standards of democratic politics systemgovernance performance. Specific to the China’s reality, China’s reform anddevelopment is carried out under the special system of “parties-nation”; the importanttool that “parties-nation” leads economic and social development change is the policiesenacted by the ruling party. Thus, the operation of the communist party of China (CPC)decision-making mechanism is the key dependent variable of the social changes ofChina’s economic development; the transformation and optimization are of importancegovernance significance.The researches on CPC’s ruling decision-making mechanism have always been thehot topics in the study of political science at home and abroad. From the existingresearches, the academic achievements relate to “state-society” relation,structure-functionalism, political culture, bureaucracy, interest groups and otherresearch paradigm and the theory angle of view, cover the conflicts and interactionbetween the political elites in the process of decision-making, the informal politicaloperation, the influence of the relationship between factions; besides, they also covermany variables, including the ruling ideology change and the policy meaning,bureaucracy system and the interests of the departments, the central-local incentive mechanism and interactive relationship, the growth of civil society and politicalparticipation of interest groups. Throughout the existing researches of academia, someof them study from the aspect of “authoritarian” theory, ignore the objective facts ofChina’s decision-making democratization; in addition, all sorts of theoreticalinterpretation model they build just reflect one side of the decision-making mechanismof China’ ruling party and lack of comprehensive analysis; some of them staticallydescribe the process of China’s ruling decision-making mechanism operation, changeand evolution, lack of corresponding theoretical analysis framework, cannot abstract thefresh ruling party’s decision-making activities theoretically; the research and analysisare not profound. From China’s decision-making practice, however, China’s rulingparty’s decision-making mechanism has undergone profound changes, present differentpractice features; therefore, the researches on China’s ruling party’s decision-makingmechanism can not be fixed in a certain historical stage, nor only carry on the empiricalanalysis from the perspective of policy science, but should put it in a long period ofhistorical time and space to inspect its evolutionary change and evaluate itsdevelopment trend.The decision-making mechanism of China’s ruling party is attached to the systemframework of China national governance model, and has evolutionary change alongwith the changes and transformation of governance pattern, but also, to a certain extent,promotes the modernization of Chinese national governance. In other words, on the onehand, the change of the national governance mode promotes the innovation andoptimization of the ruling party’s decision-making mechanism; on the other hand, thedemocratized change of the ruling party’s decision-making mechanism reacts upon thenational governance and promotes the transformation of the national governance. Fromthe perspective, when analyzing change and optimization of the decision-makingmechanism of China’s ruling party people should “embed” it into the historical processof the change and transformation of Chinese governance mode and should search for“password” of the ruling party’s decision-making mechanism change and optimizationfrom China’s governance modernization transformation clue.On the basis, from the pathof China’s modernization transformation, the internal logic of change andtransformation of governance model is analyzed; by taking “national governance modeltransformation” as “macro-structure system background”, the causal logic of China’sruling decision-making mechanism change is explained; its internal structure and thecharacteristics of process operation are analyzed; starting from the normativerequirements of modern national governance, by taking “open decision-making”practical experience as reality reference, from the dimensions of “structure-process”,optimization choice of the strategy of China’s ruling party’s decision-making mechanism is explored, becoming a new kind of research attempt.After the founding of new China, the socialist modernization national constructionthat Communist Party of China (CPC) leads on the one hand, is guided by the socialistdevelopment doctrine of Marxist theory, on the other hand, is constrained and restrainedby many reality factor such as terrible shortage of material resources, extremely highindustrial capital accumulation power cost and social fragmentation diversification. Atthe same time, as a kind of positive feedback mechanism, the successful experience thatCPC accumulated in the revolutionary war times becomes an important “pathdependence” of national construction after the founding of new China. Under thebackground, CPC chooses a “revolutionary modernization path” that “relies on therevolutionary idealism to inspire the construction enthusiasm of the mass, and dependson the highly political mobilization to exert the populace creativity”; the essence of thepath is “to non-routinely and authoritatively organize and lead modernizationconstruction with the revolutionary forces”. Revolutionary idealism and highly politicalmobilization directly result in the extreme expansion of China’s political systemcapacity and power organization network as well as the great diffusion of the functionsof CPC. The logic deduction of “revolutionary modernization” gradually generates a“totalism national governance model", which essence is to make the CPC legallymonopolize the control of the national power through the arrangement of theconstitutional law, and realize the social isomorphism integration by relying on theparty’s own organization network. Under the “totalism national governance model”,CPC, the national power and social organizations form the close and complicatedrelationship; on the one hand, they construct a set of national power organization systemwith the party as the core and the party becomes a “quasi state organ”; on the other hand,they prevent social autonomous normative power and eliminate the potential effect ofthe public domain. Thus, the “institutionalization and routinization of CPC “Charismatype authority” are realized and the “unified” party leadership and “closed” nationalgovernance system are created.The “totalism national governance model”, as “macro-structure systembackground” directly affects the construction and operation of CPC decision-makingmechanism. Under the “totalism national governance model”, the general characteristicof CPC ruling and decision-making mechanism is the “centralization” in the structureand “closure” in the operation. To be specific, the structure characteristics show sixaspects of characteristics: first, the decision-making idea of revolutionary idealism;second, highly-centralized decision-making power structure and “arbitrary” centraldecision-making mechanism; third, decision-making participation structure ofunidimensional radiation and unbalanced policy communication and coordination mechanism, as well as the policy debate under strict control, fourth, single and closedinformation system and the lack of validity of information communication; fifth, strongdependence of policy advisory system; sixth, formalized and null decision-makingsupervision and accountability. On the operation characteristics, the collectivenegotiation decision-making under the democratic centralism before the Eighth NationalCongress of CPC turned to “personal arbitrary decision-making” after the EighthNational Congress of CPC (especially the Second Session of the Eighth NationalCongress of CPC, namely, the decision-making power become increasingly “arbitrary”;the principle of democratic centralism was destroyed; the operation of thedecision-making mechanism changed from “collective negotiation under the democraticcentralism” to “arbitrary decisions of a few ones”.The generation logic of the “centralized and enclosed decision-makingmechanism” lies in the political and economic “paradox” interaction in the process of“revolutionary modernization”, that is, the setbacks and failures in economicconstruction caused by revolutionary modernization eventually feedback to the politicallevel, and result in the wide political struggle; the result of the struggle is the economicpolicy adjustment; each adjustment of the economic policy lays foundation and preparesfor the next political struggles; the cycle results are increasing scale and intensity ofpolitical struggles, and they eventually result in the constant concentration of power,and even extremalization. Besides, the political and economic paradox interaction isalso the root cause of the deformity development of totalism national governancepattern. The “deformity” development of all-round national governance modeeventually brings the “comprehensive crisis” of national governance; the essence of thecrisis is the systematical recession of governance functions, which is closely relatedwith “morbidity” operation of centralized and closed decision-making mechanism of theruling party. The “morbidity” operation of centralized and closed decision-makingmechanism of the ruling party shows two aspects of defects: one is the powerrelationship tension and imbalance within the party, as well as the resulting rupture andcollapse of policy consensus; the other is that the interest expression, interest integrationand interest coordination in the process of decision-making are confirmed andcompleted by the power elite of the ruling party by internal ways and methods, ratherthan in the benign interaction of the party-state-society; closed decision-makingparticipation structure and interests integration and coordination of power elite“recognition” cause obstacles to the public to express interest appeals smoothly andmake “public demand” and “effective supply of China” appear huge gaps. And the twokinds of defects not only inhibit the national governance ability, but also further deepenthe national governance crisis. Before reform and opening up, totalism governance model got into“comprehensive crisis”, mainly showing in the “national governance cost-benefitimbalance”, unsustainable capital accumulation of “national party ‘monopoly’, etc.National governance crisis is the leading mechanism that China transformsmodernization development path. The market factor is introduced into the constructionof socialist modernization because of the conscious pursuit of the leadership of CPC,namely, in the practice of reform and opening up, CPC overcomes governance crisis,strengthens the political considerations of ruling legitimacy and provides reasonableproof for the modernization development model of “socialism and market economy”through the “contraction-adjustment” of ideology. The development path of“market-oriented modernization” creates enormous economic wealth and also hasprofoundly changed the Chinese party-state-society relationship, that is, from" the“trinity” structure pattern gradually transforms into the one of. Lin Shangli points outthat the relative autonomy of party-state-society relationship changes the originalrelationship structure of “concentration and integration” and makes their relationshippresent the mutual syncretic “triangle” structure. Under the kind of relationshipstructure, CPC leadership over the state is embodied in effective operation and controlon the national system, and CPC leadership over the society is embodied in the effectivesocial mobilization and integration of CPC and to ensure the society can still gatheraround the party in the new social development conditions. The change of relationsbetween “party-state-society” lays a realistic foundation for governance modeltransformation and promotes the value system of governance, structure system andoperating mechanism to transform so as to conform to the specifications andrequirements of modern national governance.From the perspective of political development, the basic trend of Chinese nationalgovernance model transformation change is characterized by five aspects, that is, from“infinite politics” to “finite politics”; from “rule of man” color of governance to the of“rule of law” color of governance; from concentrated power operation todemocratization and decentralization of power; from the closed governance process toopen governance process; from the mobilization political participation to independentpolitical participation. Among them, the adaption of CPC in the party location andfunction is the core independent variable of the Chinese governance modetransformation change; the adaption opens up space for the change and optimization ofthe ruling decision-making mechanism. On the one hand, from the perspective of partyposition shift, the change of CPC from “revolutionary party” to “ruling party” meansthe systematic adaption of ideology, power attribute cognition and governing style.Open and flexible ideology, the separation and sharing of political power, democratized, scientific and rule of law governing style release the space for the transformation andoptimization of the decision-making mechanism of CPC. On the other hand, from theperspective of party function shift, the change of CPC from “revolutionary party” to“ruling party” means the shift from “ruling for the people” under the all-round nationalgovernance mode to the essential requirements “governing for the people” under thepost all-powerful national governance; within the framework of the rule of law,correctly handling the relationship between the leadership of the party and the mastersof the country; enhancing people’s initiative of ‘being the masters of the country’,improving people’s livelihood and realizing people’s “authenticity” of ‘being themasters of the country’ by developing democracy. Besides, it also means the shift of theparty’s “isomorphism integration” over the society under all-round national governancemode into the “identity integration” over society under the post all-round nationalgovernance state. The function shift of CPC opens up the space for the rulingdecision-making mechanism change. At the same time, after the reform and opening up,China’s governance practices show that the practice base points of post all-roundnational governance is “triangle” party-state-society relationship structure and theoperating mode is a democratic consultation and participatory governance; the key linklies in the rule of law, standardization in the political process; the important content isto promote the modernization construction of system; the structural demands producedby the four aspects provide endogenous power, leading power, basic power and recoilmomentum for the change and optimization of ruling party’s decision-makingmechanism.The space opened up by and the motivation provided by post totalism nationalgovernance, as macrostructure--system background promotes democracy change ofCPC’s decision-making mechanism. From the decision-making practice of reform andopening up, CPC gradually forms a set of “democratic and open” decision-makingmechanism. To be specific,“democratic and open” ruling decision-making mechanismshows six aspects of characteristics on the structural dimension: first, the“rationalization, practicability” and “openness and inclusiveness” of decision-makingconcept; second, rationalization of decision-making power configuration anddemocratization of central decision-making mechanism operation; third, communicationand coordination mechanism of multidimensional interactive participation structure and“consultation running-in”; fourth, the institutionalization of information systemconstruction and smoothness of information communication; fifth, the autonomyenhancement of decision-making consultation system; sixth, the systemization ofsupervision accountability mechanism construction. On the process dimension,“democratic and open” ruling decision-making mechanism shows the characteristics of standardization, routinization and institutionalization.Overall, under the background of post totalism national governance, the changeand optimization of the ruling decision-making mechanism show the five aspects ofbasic trend: first, pay attention to fairness and justice in policy values choice; second,the decision-making power configuration is more in line with the actual requirements ofnational construction, achieves effective balance between “centralization anddecentralization of powers” and pay attention to the transparency andinstitutionalization of the decision-making power operation; third, the decision-makingparticipation structure is multiple open and multi-phase multi-level interactionhighlights the running-in effect; fourth, the operation quality of decision-makingsubsystem is unceasingly enhanced and functions are more stably and sufficientlyexerted; fifth, under the goal orientation of the democratic, science and rule of law,decision-making mechanism operates smoothly and orderly as a whole. From theperspective of the reaction of the ruling decision-making mechanism on nationalgovernance, on the one hand, the good governance performance obtained after thereform and opening is closely related with the “normative, orderly and efficientdecision-making mechanism” that the ruling party forms; on the other hand, thedemocratization change of the ruling party’s decision-making mechanism becomes anefficient path to promote the modernization of national governance, that is, thedemocratization change of the ruling party’s decision-making mechanism can not onlymeet the need of governance requirements of “democratic and rule of law" as well as“multiple openness” of national management modernization, but also can shape the“legitimacy” and generate the “consensual governance” that the modernization ofnational governance needs.From the perspective of the operation of China’s current ruling party’sdecision-making mechanism, there are still some bottleneck problems, including“certain tense nature within decision-making philosophy discourse”,“low transparencyof decision-making power”“unbalance between interests expression and interests inputmechanisms” and “lack of democratic competition mechanism in decision scheme”. Thein-depth research show that the institutional problems restricting the functions ofChina’s ruling party’s decision-making mechanism are not only due to the “chronicdiseases” in the structure and operation of the ruling party’s decision-makingmechanism, but also because the change optimization of the ruling party’sdecision-making mechanism still cannot meet the specification requirements of modernnational governance. Thus, from the basic principles and regulatory requirements ofmodern national governance, and by combining with the practice experience ofdecision-making democratization, that is, from the dual dimension of “theory and reality”, optimization strategy choice of China’s ruling party’s decision-makingmechanism is explored. On the one hand, the researchers need to start from modernnational governance value principle under the framework of “good governance”, studythe function orientation of China’s ruling party’s decision-making mechanismoptimization, establish the practice framework of the decision-making mechanismoptimization based on the function orientation; on the other hand, the researchers needto take the local practice and experience enlightenments of “open decision-making” asreference and put forward the concrete strategy choice of decision-making mechanismoptimization. |
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