Agriculture Intellectual Property Protection And Institution Innovation

The neoclassical growth theory claims that the technical progress is the main driving force for the sustainable economic growth. While issues derived from the technical research, the technical utilization and the technical transfer, such as definition of property right, the benefit-sharing and the Infringement Remedy are to be solved by the application of the intellectual property protection system in recent years. Thus, the protection of the intellectual property rights of our country’s agriculture has been brought to an important strategic height. In the year of 2009 and 2011, National Outline Of Intellectual Property Rights Strategy and Outline Of Intellectual Property Rights Strategy Of The Agriculture have been issued successively by Chinese government.As one kind of the property right structure and the system arrangement, the intellectual property system for agriculture devote itself to the interest balance between the owners and the users on the basis of "property Right——Profit". The reasonable definition of the property rights offers the utility maximization of the transaction participants. However, it does not always mean the strict definition of property rights. The definition of the property rights for the agriculture can be weakened under some circumstances. Admittedly, the institutional change of the intellectual property rights of the agriculture follow the gradual process from imbalance to balance. This gradual process of balance is limited by the institutional demand and supply, and eventually betrays some cobweb-fluctuations in a fixed period. Our researchs demonstrates that the system of our country’s intellectual property rights of the agriculture is not based on the real need of the system, which is strongly accompanied with characteristics of administrative authority. Additionally, by the use of our matrix of game theory profit model and by comparing tort to relief, and obligee to potential infringer behavior choice, we may safely conclude that increasing punitive damages can effectively prevent the tort of intellectual property rights from happening.This dissertation points out the reverse pyramid pattern of the protection system of Hunan province’s agriculture intellectual property by empirical research on Hunan province’s agriculture intellectual property, meanwhile, by constructing the evaluation index system of the protection of the intellectual property. In other words, people have limited consciousness about the protection of the intellectual property, and their understanding, identification and dependency of the intellectual property also are at very low level. Contrary to it, the strength of the legislation and enforcement tends to be systematized and completed. The truth of this paradox is that our protection system of the agriculture intellectual property is not based on the effective system demand but on the utilitarianism of the administrative power. So this paradox reduces the contribution of the agriculture intellectual property. According to the Cobb-douglas production function, the agriculture intellectual property plays only 0.76% part of the agriculture economic growth, a very small amount compared to the parts the fixed assets investment and the labor force plays.It has been illustrated both theoretically and practically that the resource endowment and the external high risks of the agriculture demand that protection system of the agriculture intellectual property should be different and independent from other intellectual property. A personalized institutional system should be rebuilt on the foundation of the regional variations, the industrial difference as well as product diversity. From the perspective of policy significance, this finding will provide empirical and theoretical support in the formulating of the Hunan province’s outline of intellectual property rights strategy of the agriculture.