Research On The Coupling Mode Of Agricultural Credit And Insurance In China

This paper use evolutionary game theory to analyze the behavior evolutions in and between the interest groups of government, farmers, rural credit agency and insurance company in the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism. It finds the methods to maintain the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism’s continuous operation. The local government provides higher percentages of premium subsidies to farmers insured. This makes the premium subsidies amount meet the corresponding parameter conditions and borrowing farmers groups’ stationary policy be active insured. The local government’s providing business subsides to agricultural insurance institutions and reinsurance for agricultural insurance business, is the practical requirement for insurance institution groups to make their stationary policy as active participation in the cooperation with credit business. And it’s the stop-loss reinsurance rather than proportion reinsurance that will stimulate the insurance institutions’initiative to cooperate. With limited government subsides, rural credit agency reduces the agency cost of the participated insurance products while the insurance company may control developing costs of agriculture-related insurance. This is also a ignificant approach to maintain the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism’s continuous operation. Based on the behavior evolution consequences of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism stakeholders, the dissertation will consummate the existing agricultural credit and insurance coupling product system, put forward some coupling product operating mode such as "agriculture-related credit+agricultural insurance+reinsurance","comprehensive insurance+agricultural loans", etc. Since bringing borrowing farmers’ insurance information into credit evaluation system is the prediction to set loan rate and the line of credit for the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism, we employ the WU’s3d credit theory to establish the insured farmers’ comprehensive credit evaluation method. Simultaneously, we come up with the general pricing for "agriculture-related credit+insurance" combined Basel ⅡIRB, based on the evaluation method mentioned above.We carry out empirical analysis to the relationship between borrowing farmers’insurance choice and twelve influence factors to their insurance preference in four aspects:household characteristics, induced demand, natural endowment and currently industry degree. Then, we find out the factors which have significant impact on farmers’insurance options. With the empirical results, we suggest to improve borrowing farmers’enthusiasm of the insured by intensifying propaganda, improving the insurance service efficiency, raising their income level etc. so as to ensure the demand drivers of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling products.Next, the paper analyzes the development status and existing problems of agricultural credit and insurance coupling products, and comes up with cooperation principles to regulate the behavior between rural credit agencies and insurance institutions, ensuring the lawful rights and interests of agriculture credit agencies, insurance institutions and borrowing farmers during the operation of the coupling mechanism. Then, we analyze the asymmetry of the development of credit and insurance in the coupling mechanism, and build the risk diversification and control mechanisms for agricultural catastrophe, and long-term compensation mechanism for insurance funds. In the end, the paper analyzes the development environment of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism, and perfects its credit environment, regulatory environment and legal environment.