The Research On Suppler Development And Supplier Switch With Asymmetric Information

The supply chain coordination can make the total supply chain get themaximum profit, but the supply chain is composed of enterprises with difer-ent benefits, and the enterprises will hide their information in the informationsharing process of the total supply chain to obtain their own profits, so the asym-metric information exists widely in the process of coordination and the contractformulation of supply chain. Based on the theory of principal-agent, the pricingcontract of the dominant supplier to the manufacture, the investment develop-ment of supplier and the supplier switching are researched, and the stability ofthe three-level supply chain switch system with delay is analyzed. It is composedof the following five aspects.A contract for the dominant supplier with asymmetric information is de-signed and analyzed. The supplier sells his products to a manufacturer whoreprocesses and sell to the market, the manufacturer pays to the dominant sup-plier the sale price and transfer payment. A principal-agent model is establishedto maximize the profit of the supplier, and the sale price and the transfer paymentto the dominant supplier can be obtained through the analysis of the objectivefunction, the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint.The sale price of the dominant supplier is increasing with the increase of thereprocessed cost of the manufacturer, while the transfer payment to the domi-nant supplier is decreasing. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustratethe efectiveness of the proposed model.The investment development of supplier with asymmetric information isstudied. The supplier can improve quality and decrease cost through his owninvestment, the investment quantity can be considered as his private information,and the enterprise can determine the purchasing quantity and transfer paymentthrough the supplier’s reported investment quantity. As the incentive compati-bility constraint and the participation constraint, the enterprize and make surethe supplier report his true investment quantity. The purchasing quantity and the transfer payment function can be obtained through the analysis of the con-straints. Finally a numerical example is given to illustrate the efectiveness ofthe supplier investment model and the contract.The supplier switching problem with asymmetric information is given, andthe supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm’s total pro-curement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier,the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost. With the theoreticalanalysis of the proposed model, the supplier switching strategy can be obtained.The principal-agent problem for supplier switching with taking into accountthe asymmetric information and the competition efect is studied, where thebuying firm’s assessment to the entrant supplier’s cost is described as a fuzzyvariable. Through the analysis of the participation constraint, the incentivecompatibility constraint and the objective function, the equivalent model of thefuzzy principal-agent problem for supplier switching is proposed, and the optimalsupplier switching strategy is obtained. Additionally, the supplier switching de-cision under symmetric information is also studied. Finally, an example is givento illustrate the efectiveness of the proposed model and the supplier switchingstrategy.A three-level supply chain switch system with time delay is proposed. Whenthe production capacity is fixed, the distributor and the retailer supply accord-ing to the inventory quantity level, the three-level supply chain system can beconverted into a linear switch system. As the supply quantity of each level islarger than zero, the manufacturer does not produce if the inventory is adequate,the distributor and retailer do not make an order if the inventory quantity islarger than the safe inventory quantity, the stability of the three-level supplychain switch system is analyzed through simulation.