Study On The Actors’ Bhaviour And Cooperation Mechanism Of Forestry Cooperation Organization

Forestry cooperation organization is an important forestry management form after the reform of collective forest property right system, and it has been a hot issue in the forestry business community. Due to various reasons, some forestry cooperation organizations are facing many serious cooperation problems. This study is focusing on the actors’behaviour to explore the evolvement law of the actors’ behaviour and to find the condition and mechanism of cooperation. The study is conducive to clear away the cooperation obstacle and promote the forestry cooperation organization’s development.First, the concept of the forestry cooperation organization is defined based on literature. In this essay the forestry cooperation organization is defined as a muster of actors who cooperate in the field of forestry production or forestry transaction and have a certain interest target. According to the component of actors, the forestry cooperation organizations are divided into three types:"Corporation+farmers","farmers+farmers" and "government+farmers".Second, the game theory, the transaction cost theory and the scale economics theory are used to analyse the forming cause of the forestry cooperation organization. The interior reason of the forming of the forestry cooperation organization is to obtain the exterior resource, to achieve the scale economy, to reduce transaction cost and so on. Moreover, the forming of the forestry cooperation organization is influenced by exterior factors. Thereinto the collective forest tenure reform is the basic background, supply scarcity of institution is the radical reason, and the government is the first impetus. The development actualities of the forestry cooperation organization in China are also introduced in this study.Third, the actors’ behaviour of forestry cooperation organization is studied from the point of the actors’initiative. The initiative actualities of the farmers, the corporation, the supervisor and the government, and their behaviour incentive are analysed. In allusion to the localization of the actors’ initiative, some corresponding means are indicated to implement the farmers, corporation, supervisor and the government’s initiative.Fourth, the evolutionary game theorey is employed to analyse the relation between the two different actors which come from the inside or the outside of the forestry cooperation organization. Moreover, the potential factors which influence the actors’behaviour are investigated in the paper. In allusion to the condition and occasion appearing the best equilibrium, the corresponding suggestions are indicated in the paper. In the course of the boxing between two actors, the actors’behaviour and the system’s evolvement route are not only influenced by the cooperation lucre and cost, but also influenced by both sides’original cooperation desire. Under different condition, the actors’boxing appears different state. Some means, such as increasing the cooperation lucre and the actors’ cooperation desire, will improve the actors’behaviour.Fifth, certain cooperation mechanisms are established in the paper to improve the actors’ behaviour and promote the development of the forestry cooperation organization. The distribution of cooperation benefit is an important and sensitive issue in forestry cooperation organization. Impartial and efficient benefit distribution mode plays an important role in promoting the healthy development of forestry cooperation organization and increasing peasants’income. Based on the traits such as heterogeneous members and lucre lag in forestry cooperation organization, J.S.Admas’Justice Theory is used to construct the model of benefit distribution of "Corporation+farmers" mode. In allusion to the actors’opportunism behaviour, punishment mechanism is constructed in the paper. Based on the evolutionary game model, it shows that the proper amount of the fell back money will restrained the actors’opportunism behaviour. For the forestry cooperation organization which is composed with the same character farmers, the evolutionary game theorey is employed to investigate the effect of government’s prompting. It shows that the prompting from the government will improve the farmers’behaviour. The more prompting from the government, the probability that system tends to cooperation state will be more big and the forestry will be more steady.