The Governance On Conflict Of Interest Of Leading Cadres From The Perspective Of Informal Institution

In the period of benefit gambling and value pluralism, it's difficult to avoid the potential and practical conflict between the private interest and the public interest in the exercise of the power by leading cadres, therefore it becomes an important source of corruption and the government's trust crisis. Through establishing an effective institutional barriers to blocking the risk of leading cadres'conflict of interest, has become a common practice in the international community. The fourth Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee firstly proposed to establish a sound system to preventing conflict of interest in 2009, and right now it has passed nearly 200 related laws and regulations. However, the severe situation of conflict of interest has not been fundamentally curbed. Although, the lack of formal institution is the key reason, the weakness of informal institution, such as the lack of acceptance, cultural identity, moral consciousness and habits support, is the underlying causes of failure of the governance on leading cadres'conflict of interest.From the perspective of informal institution, This study made full use of method of literature, historical, social investigation and system analysis. The theory of clean government of Marxism classical writer, the theory of anti-corruption of the leader of Communist Party of China, and the theory of New Institutionalism provide a theoretical basis for this study. Through the problem of Leading cadres'conflict of interest and its present situation on Governance of China, and based on the mechanism of Informal institution effect on the Governance of Leading cadres'conflict of interest, this study established a model and implemented an empirical research of Informal institution effect on the Governance of Leading cadres'conflict of interest. Finally, Put forward the countermeasures to promote the process of anti-corruption, and strengthen the ability to run the Communist Party of China. The main research contents are as follows:First of all, according to analysis of the lack of occurrence mechanism and governance failure of leading cadres'conflict of interest, and through deeply interviews to some leading cadres in city of Dalian, Changsha and Wuxi, this study summarized the recognition elements, types, performance and damage, subjective internal and external environment factors of leading cadres'conflict of interest in the reality of China. And then this study extracted the model of behavior choice and constraints factor for leading cadres'conflict of interest. In addition, through the analysis of governance system evolution and its effects on leading cadres'conflict of interest from the reform and opening up of China, had found out the Practical Basis of this study.Second, on the basis of existing research, this study divided the elements of informal institution that influenced on governance of leading cadres'conflict of interest, into four key elements which were values, cultural tradition, ethics and customs. And Based on the analysis of informal institution impact on institutional supply, institutional change, institutional costs and institutional evolution, focused on the mechanism of governance on leading cadres' conflict of interest. Compared with the existing theoretical framework, each factor of informal institution achieve a comprehensive effect on the subjective motivation, opportunity and risk of leading cadres'behavior choice of conflict of interest. So as to this study reveals the effect mechanism of informal institution governance on leading cadres'conflict of interest.And then, based on the theoretical analysis, this study constructs the theoretical model and puts forward the hypothesis of informal institution effect on the governance of leading cadres'conflict of interest. Through the questionnaire survey on 250 leading cadres in city of Dalian, Shenyang, Changsha, Wuxi and Chenzhou, and making use of SPSS20.0 for statistical analysis, this study verified the hypothesis of the governance on leading cadres' conflict of interest. The empirical results show that, the social value orientation, collective value orientation, individual value orientation, Individual spirit of contract, social tolerance, personal morality and social conventions has significant positive effect on the behavior of the public interest. However, family oriented with customs has negative effect on the behavior of the public interest.Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and empirical results, this study proposes the implementation strategy of the perspective of informal institution of governance on leading cadres'conflict of interest. Such as, by tackling the problem both the symptoms and root causes in a comprehensive, paying attention to prevention, and following the progressive and induced changes of governance, maing full use of linkage mechanism of learning and education, multiple incentives, assessment and accountability as well as demonstration leading, to strengthen the optimization path of governance on conflict of interest, in which formal institution and informal institution could interact each other and be a restraint force for governance on leading cadres'conflict of interest.