Reverse And Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models With Considering Consumers Behavior And Government Regulation

With the development of technology and economics,products update more rapidly,this lead to many solid wastes.It will pollute the environment if these wastes can not be dealed in a proper way.A great number of product take-back regulations have been enacted by the government around the world to require the manufacturer to provide a system or financial means to collect and process used products to control environmental pollution.As the supply side of used products,consumers behavior has great impacts on the supply quantity of used products and firm's decision and profit.Therefore,researching the consumers behavior and government regulation in reverse/closed-loop supply chain not only can enrich the basic theories of reverse/closed-loop supply chain management,but also can provide suggestions for the decisions of firm and government.In this paper,we based on the two background of consumer behavior and reverse supply chain,to research the trade-in program with limited promotion period under manufacturer collection channel.Then we research the coordination contract for reverse supply chain.Based on the two background of government regulation and closed-loop supply chain,we research the closed-loop supply chain model under hybrid sale/collection channel.Then we compare the pay-as-you-throw system and the recycling fund system under recycling alliance collection channel.(1)In the research of the trade-in program with limited promotion period,we build a baseline model assuming that consumers are myopic,followed by a two-stage model for strategic consumers as an extension.Finally,this work extends the two-stage model to a subsidy variation model and a valuation variation model.The analytical results provide the following generalizations:1)When consumers are myopic,a firm can promote trade-in,reduce subsidy and gain more benefit through lengthening the trade-in promotion period,increasing the level of product upgrade,shortening the product life cycle,or increasing the proportion of consumers who are waiting for the first-generation products.2)When consumers are strategic,some of them will wait for the second-generation products only if the level of the product upgrade is above a threshold.Therein,further increasing the level of product upgrade has no influence on either consumers' purchase behavior or a firm's subsidy decision and profit.Otherwise,strategic consumers are not distinguishable from myopic consumers.3)For the case of strategic consumers,a firm can also promote trade-in,reduce subsidy and gain more benefit through lengthening the trade-in promotion period,shortening the product lifecycle,or increasing the proportion of consumers who are waiting for the first-generation products.4)Fewer consumers will participate in the trade-in program if a firm dramatically reduces trade-in subsidy or consumers' valuation of the second-generation products decreases dramatically in the delayed purchase interval.(2)In the research of the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)with hybrid channel,we build a CLSC model with considering hybrid sale/collection channels under government regulations.Then optimal parameters for government regulation,optimal decision-makings and profits of CLSC members,social welfare and consumer surplus were obtained based on game analysis method.The results show that:1)The higher the fee levied for WEEE disposal,the higher the wholesale price,the direct selling price and distribution price.2)The higher the subsidy for WEEE recycling,the higher the collection price and collection amount of WEEE.3)With the increase of consumer environmental consciousness and sensitivity to WEEE collection price,the collection amount of WEEE,the profits of CLSC members,social welfare and consumer surplus will increase.4)An increasing in customer sensitivity would decrease the profits of manufacturer and retailer,social welfare and customer surplus,but it has no influence on the profits of third-party collector and recycler.(3)In the research of the coordination of reverse supply chain with considering consumers behavior,we build a reverse supply chain model with strategic consumers recycling behavior based on the classical newsvendor problem.Then we propose five typical contracts to coordinate the decentralized reverse supply chain with strategic recycling behavior(transfer price contract,two-stage price contract,cost-pooling contract,subsidy contract and indemnity contract).Our research indicates that:1)The transfer price contract can coordinate the reverse supply chain only when the manufacturer earns zero benefit.2)Under a two-stage price contract the manufacturer can increase the collection quantity by offering a direct incentive to the collector.3)Using the centralized optimal profit as the benchmark,we compare the transfer price contract with the subsidy contract and the cost-pooling contract respectively.The results show that the subsidy contract is more beneficial to the manufacturer,while the cost-pooling contract makes more profits for the collector.4)We also design an indemnity contract and conclude that total profit under the indemnity contract is bigger than that under the transfer price contract.(4)In the research of closed-loop supply chain under two different financial system,we first develop two closed-loop supply chain models with alliance recycling under pay-as-you-throw(PAYT)system and recycling fund(RF)system respectively.The primary goal behind analytic formulation is to investigate the differences between the two financial systems and find out which one performs better,as well as the influence of target recycling rate and competition from recycling system.Our analysis reveals that:1)The PAYT system is always performs better for consumers and retailer.The RF system performs better for the social welfare when there is no competition or tiny competition.2)Which financial system performs better for the RA and the manufacturers depends on the baseline of subsidy fee.3)Which system performs better for manufacturers depends on their shares.However,if there is competition between RAs,we have:4)The PAYT system is beneficial to customers and the retailer,while the RF system benefits the disadvantaged RA.5)The RF system is propitious to the social welfare only if there is no distinct difference between the RA's advantage in cost savings.Based on the research of consumers behavior and government regulation in reverse/closed-loop supply chain,this paper not only enrich the basic theories of reverse/closed-loop supply chain management,but also help the firm to grasp the operation mechanism of the reverse/closed-loop supply chain.This paper also provides some suggestions for the firm and government to make better decisions.