Research On Recycling Mode Selection Of Closed Loop Supply Chain Considering Quality Classification Of Recycled Products Under Government Intervention Mechanism

In the past two years,the first batch of large-scale decommissioned electric vehicle batteries(EVB)have appeared in China.Therefore,the recycling of EVB has attracted people’s attention.The recycling of EVB is a job full of opportunities and challenges: if it is recycled properly,it can turn waste into treasure;if it is not recycled properly,it will waste resources and pollute the environment.Chinese government has introduced a number of policies to promote the recycling of EVB,but the guidance effect is not ideal.In order to explore more efficient recycling modes,this study discusses the selection of recycling modes in closed-loop supply chains under different government intervention mechanisms and considering recycling quality classification.Firstly,three recycling modes are defined: manufacturer recycling mode(M mode),manufacturer commissioned third-party recycler recycling mode(T mode),and manufacturer cooperated with third-party recycler recycling mode(MT mode).Secondly,this study establishes the function models of the three recycling modes under the non-intervention mechanism,government reward and punishment mechanism and government carbon tax mechanism,and then obtains the equilibrium solutions of manufacturer,retailer and third-party recycler in each case through centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making.Finally,by comparing and analyzing the equilibrium solutions in each case,and using examples to verify,the main conclusions are as follows.(ⅰ)The retail price of centralized decision-making is lower than that of decentralized decision-making,and the recovery price and recovery quantity of centralized decision-making are not lower than those of decentralized decision-making.(ⅱ)No matter in which mechanism,there are: in the M mode,the recovery price,the recovery quantity,the manufacturer’s profit and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain are the highest;in the T mode,they are the lowest,but T mode is the most favorable for the third-party recycler’s profit;in the three recycling modes,the retailer’s profit is equal.(ⅲ)The quality grade of recycled products has no influence on the retail price and wholesale price,but has great influence on the recovery price and recovery quantity,no matter the quality grade of recycled products is too high or too low,it will lead to too low recovery price and too little recovery quantity.(ⅳ)The buy-back price,recovery price,recovery quantity and the influence of the quality of recycled products on the buy-back price increase with the increase of reward and punishment intensity and carbon tax rate.The wholesale price and retail price are not affected by the reward and punishment mechanism,but will increase with the increase of carbon tax rate.(ⅴ)Both reward and punishment mechanism and carbon tax mechanism can increase the buy-back price,recycle price,recycle quantity,and expand the influence of the quality of recycled products on the buy-back price.However,which mechanism is better depends on the numerical relation between reward and punishment intensity,carbon tax rate,and the quality grade of recycled products.In conclusion,the government intervention mechanism can promote the recycling of EVB,but it does not change the best recycling mode selection strategy of manufacturer,retailer and third-party recycler in the EVB closed-loop supply chain.M mode is the best for the manufacturer’s profit and the overall profit of closed-loop supply chain,and T mode is only beneficial for the third-party recycler.Therefore,the manufacturer should choose M mode,the third-party recycler should choose T mode,and the retailer has no preference for the three recycling modes.The thesis has 22 figures,4 tables and 81 references.