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The Effect Evaluation Of Competitive Reform In China's Electric Power Industry

Posted on:2019-04-17Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y M PangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1362330542496980Subject:National Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Electric power industry is a typical natural monopoly industry,which usually monopolized in the early stage,but with the progress of technology and the development of social economy,the natural monopoly property is gradually weakening in some sectors.In order to strengthen the competition of electric power industry,many countries.have gradually stripped the competitive generation and selling sectors from vertical integrated operation chain,builded competitive power generation and electricity sale market,complete the interaction between supply side and demand side through multilateral trading.The competitive reform of China's power industry has gone through more than forty years.The initial investment system reform relaxed the access limit of the power generation industry and broked the monopoly situation.Then,the "Plant-Network Separation" reform separated power generation sector from the vertical integration operation chain,and eliminated the vertical monopoly of the grid enterprise.In 2015,China's State Council issued "Several opinions on further deepening the reform of the electric power system",put forward the reform task of "three liberalized,one independent,three strengthening",which focused on the reform of electric distribution and sale market.Although the competitive reform in China's electric power industry is deepening,the effect of the reform has been controversial.Focusing on the effect evaluation of competitive reform in China's electric power industry,this paper examines the competitive situation of China's power industry from multiple perspectives,evaluates the effect of investment system reform and the vertical unbunding reform through empirical tests.Summarizes the reform process of the transmission and distribution sectors and simulates the reform effects based on the perspective of electricity price.The main contents of this paper are as follows:First,the evaluation of the competition situation of China's power industry.Harvard School believes that competition is a state,and market structure determines the degree of market competition,while the Neo-Austrian School believes that competition is behavior and process,only use the market structure index cannot accurately describe the competition situation in an industry.This paper combines these two points of view,evaluates the competition status of China's power industry from different perspectives.Firstly,this paper examines the market structure and market power of the national electricity market and regional electricity market using the data of power generation enterprises and power grid enterprises.On this basis,we further investigate the behavior of all enterprises in the industry from the dynamic perspective,uses the industry instability index and BHC and GR efficiency decomposition analyze the competitive behavior and process of power listed companies and micro power enterprises,analyzes the entry and exit,the expansion of enterprises themselves and the flow of elements among enterprises.Second,the influence of the investment system reform on the efficiency of the power generation industry and the convergence test of the efficiency of the regional power generation market.The competitive reform of China's electric power industry begins with the relaxing access in the power generation industry.After a long period of reform,the power generation market has formed a diversified competition structure.In this paper,the OP method is used to calculate the efficiency of power generation listed companies and micro power generation enterprises,and then analyzes the dynamic distribution of power generation efficiency trough nuclear density distribution map.Secondly,on the basis of the previous analysis,this paper tests the effect of the introduction of competition and property rights reform by constructing multiple regression model,the robustness of the empirical results is tested by transformation estimation method and replacement of explanatory variable.Finally,considering the characteristics of the provincial electricity market in China,this paper makes a comparative analysis of the efficiency differences of the provincial power generation industries,and conducts a convergence test on the efficiency differences of regional generation markets by? convergence and ? convergence methods.Third,an empirical test of the impact of the "Plant-Network Separation" reform on the efficiency of micro electric power enterprises.The vertical unbunding reform centered on the separation of plant and network separated the competitive power generation sector from the transmission network that has natural monopoly feature.This paper first analyzes the competition effect of vertical separation reform in China's power industry.On this basis,770 electrical genertation enterprises and 1494 electrical appliance network enterprises with long duration before and after the reform are divided into experimental group and control group,and the difference-in-difference model is used in order to find the reform impact on the total factor productivity of power generation enterprises and appliance network enterprises.Then,we conduct the robustness tests by computing processing effect using nearest neighbor matching,caliper' matching and kernel matching methods.Fourth,the analysis of the reform process of the transmission and distribution link and the simulation of the electricity price effect.By summarizing the relevant documents of the transmission and distribution links since the new round of electricity system reform,this paper analyzes the target and path of the reform of the power supply and distribution sector in China's power industry.Then,investigates the reform progress of transmission and distribution links from four aspects,including relax market access in electricity sale and incremental distribution business,the reform of transmission and distribution price,the establishment of electricity trading institutions and the marketization of transactions.The analysis shows that the reform has reduced the price of some terminal electricity consumption,the electricity expenditure of industrial and commercial enterprises been reduced,and the reform dividend is continuously released.Then,combined with the current situation of China's power industry reform,this paper constructes a general equilibrium model to simulate the impact of electricity price decline on the industry's production and socio-economic indicators after the new round of power system reform.
Keywords/Search Tags:power industry, competitive reform, relaxed access, vertical separation, total factor productivity
PDF Full Text Request
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