Study On The Barriers And Mechanism Of Industrial Land Intensive Use

Industial land is an important foudnation for urban development.But with the acceleration of urbainzation,the extensive use of industrial land becomes pervasive at every part of the country,following by serious social problems.Since the market economy,new stakeholders of land utilization have emerged,and meanwhile the interests of original stakeholders become diverse,making the industrial land use environment more complicated.Therefore,it is especially important to carry out research on the multivple governance entities of indutrial land intensive use.Plenty of research on industrial land intensive use have been done by schoalrs,and some scholars of them also explore this problem from the perspecive of stakeholers,but there is still a lack of further theretical and empirical analysis.In this way,this study takes the industrial land intensive use and the modernization of the national governance system as the starting point,and analyzes the interests and actions of three main protagonists of intensive use namely the central government,local govenrment and indsurial enterpises.Data evelopoing method,game theory,production function and system dynamics are applied to summarize the institutional environment barrier,governance structural barrier and operational barrier that hinder the intensive use of industrial land.In the hope of improving the intensive utilization level of indsutrial land in China,the research focuses on constructing and demonstrating an intensivism-efficiency synergy mechanism under the barrier elimination principle,in which government invention,market allocation and social participation are included.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The stakeholders of industrial land intesive use include the central government,the central land administration departments(Ministry of Natural Resources/National Development and Reform Commison/Misnistry of Industry and Infromation Technology),local government,local land administration departments,relevant supervision departments,industrial enterprises and enrionmental protection organizatoins.Definitive stakeholders,represented by the central government,have strong characteristics of power,legitimacy and urgency;expectant stakeholers,represented by local government,have obvious attributes of power and legitimate;latent stakeholers,respresented by industrial enterprises,only show power feature.(2)Under the background of the existing land management system and the land market system,the central government faces great challenges in improving the utilization level of industrial land.The average technical efficiency of urban industrial land in the coutry is relative low,and there exists huge gap in the scale efficiency of industrial land use among cities.The cities with constant returns to scale are mainly distributed in the Southwest and Central-South regions;the cities with increasing retuns to scale are those in North,Northeast and Southwest China;cities with diminishing returns are mainly distributed in East China and the central south region.In additon,there are far more cities with redundant land input than citiese with redundant capital and labor inputs.The produciton scale in single province turns to enjoy high similarity.For example,if one city is in increasing returns of scale,then the returns of scale of another city in the same province is likely to increase too.For local government,the performance appraisal system based on economic indicators and the production tax dominated tax system have led to local government's extensive use activity on industrial land.The indsutrial land governance structure is a closed loop composed of the central government,local government and the market.In this loop,the central government and local government form a top-down relatiosnhip chain with political achievements as the nodes.The local government and the market also form a top-down relationship chain with taxation as the node,but the down-top chain starting from market is absent.It is unrealistic to rely solely on local governments to achieve industrial land intensive use withou market feedback.The game equilibrium analysis shows that if the performance penalty can be added to the existing performance appraisal system and the regional differentiated land supply pattern is implemented,the possibility of local government adopting the extensive land use strategy will be reduced.The ultimate goal of enterprises is to maximize the benefits of the prodcution.Nowadays,although industrilization has developed to a certain stage,labor-intensive industries still account for a relative high proportion,the amounts of captial-intensive and technology intensive enterprises are not satisfactory.The results of the ridge regression on production function indicate that the land elasticity coefficient of labor-intensive enterprises is extremely low,which means industrial land input will not generate obvious improvement effect on output.Industrial-differentiated land supply and policy support measures should be introduced to guide industrial transformation.(3)Industrial land intensive use mechanism is the key to coordinating conflicts among protagonists,eliminating institutional/governance stuctural/operational barriers,and promoting land intensive use.The interests of protagonists can be divided into three types:overall rationality,local rationality and individual rationality.These three rationality collide with each other,and produce situational conflicts and structural conflicts,which in turn generate intensive land barriers.Integrating government intervention mechanism,market allocation mechanism and social participation mechanism into industrial land intensivism-efficiency synergy mechanism can coordinate protagonists' interest and eliminate barriers.The emiprical anlysis results from system dynamics present that government intervention,market allocation and social participation really do improve the intensive utilization level.Not surprisingly,the effective combination of these three show the greatest impact on intensive land use.Eliminating institutional envirornmental barriers can improve the intensive use level in a short period of time,but its stamina is poor;the elimination of operatioanl barriers can largely improve the level of land intensification;the effect of eliminating governance barriers and institutional environmental is not much different.The institutional barriers and governance structure barriers can be eliminated with the implementation of government intervention and market allocation,increasing the land use intensity and input intensity;The combination of government intervention and social participation is the main means to eliminate barriers in operation dimension,and then improving the environmental and economic benefits of intensive land use.(4)In order to ensure the effectiveness of the synergy mechanism and eliminated the barriers,differentiated land management and industry management system are necessary.Here are the detailed policy recommendations:strengthen the central government's management in indsutrial land,cuiltivate the awareness of intensive use in land department;optimize the intensive use of institutional environment sucha as perfecting the industrial land marketization system,performance appraisal system and land stock financial system;improve social participation mechanism and take the road of industrial transition.