The economics of real estate brokerage and contracts

This dissertation collects research on real estate brokerage and contract theory that was completed while the author was a student at the University of California, San Diego.;Chapter 1 presents an empirical analysis of the role of social networks in economic decision-making. Specifically, it is demonstrated that individuals are likely to choose the same real estate agent as a peer who is in the same social network. Evidence is presented that the social influence comes through peer-to-peer communication.;Chapter 2 offers a simple model of hold-up in a contracting environment where the contracted trade retains its value indefinitely. A simple option contract has both an efficient and an inefficient hold-up equilibrium. More complicated contracts can uniquely implement any efficient outcome.;Chapter 3 investigates whether entry into the real estate brokerage industry is inefficiently high. Previous research on this topic suffers from restrictive data. Use of data from a multiple listing service allows for heterogeneity between agents and addresses the omitted variable problem.