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Petitions and authoritarian resilience: The case of China

Posted on:2012-11-22Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Princeton UniversityCandidate:Chen, JingFull Text:PDF
GTID:1456390008493803Subject:Asian Studies
Abstract/Summary:
Why does decentralized authoritarianism show more resilience in China than in other countries? Decentralization normally does not harmonize well with authoritarianism because it presumably strengthens local authorities at the expense of the central government. In the long run, the irreconcilable tension between decentralization and authoritarianism often precipitates the fall of authoritarian regimes. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are cases in point---but China proves to be an exception in this regard. While enjoying the rapid economic growth promoted by its de facto federalism, the Chinese central government generally remains in control of its local governments. How has China achieved this?;This study develops an informational theory to account for the coexistence of China's exceptionally resilient authoritarianism and its high decentralization. The information contained in citizens' complaints, which are filed through the petition system, helps to strengthen China's authoritarianism in three ways. First, higher level governments obtain valuable information about lower level officials' performance in policy implementation, public goods provision, and corruption. Higher level governments need this information in order to effectively utilize the cadre management system to reward good performance and punish malpractice. Second, citizens' grievances are revealed in these petitions and are mostly addressed in their beginning stages. When citizens' complaints are rooted in central policy, they set the agenda for policy change in order to maintain social order. Third, the central government makes itself the ally of citizens when it handles their petitions. As a result, the petition system grants the central government an opportunity to hold local officials accountable, scapegoat local authorities and claim all the credits for itself. This helps to build citizens' trust in their central government and reinforce its legitimacy.;The evidence of my argument is drawn from qualitative and quantitative analysis of petitions filed to the town, municipal, and central governments. In light of this study's findings, a new model of responsive authoritarianism is proposed for China polity. The implication is that electoral democracy may not be the only answer to the political futures of developing countries.
Keywords/Search Tags:China, Central, Authoritarianism, Petitions
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