Deterring international terrorism: The effectiveness of United States policy, 1970--1990

Although a wide range of strategies have been used in practice, the stated policy of the United States government to combat terrorism is one of deterrence. Through a strategy of deterrence the United States attempts to raise the perceived costs and risks of terrorism while lowering its benefits. This dissertation uses deterrence theory to analyze the effectiveness of four US actions intended to reduce terrorism: the adoption of a "no concessions" policy in 1970, the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran in1985, the bombing of Libya in 1986, and the imposition of economic sanctions on Syria in 1986, In the first case the analysis focuses on the utility calculations of several Latin American terrorist groups involved in the abduction of US citizens. The remaining cases analyze the utility of terrorism as perceived by the governments of Iran, Libya, and Syria.; The study finds that in each case, deterrence was initially a successful strategy although in some instances the effectiveness of individual deterrent actions appeared to dissipate over time. Additionally, the results of this study provide robust support for rational choice as an explanation for terrorism. The evidence suggests that the actors under study chose terrorism as a means to attain desired goals. To the degree that US deterrent actions affected the net utility of terrorism, the terrorist actors appeared to rationally modify their behavior as predicted by deterrence theory. Conversely, terrorist reactions to US policy actions were generally opposite to what non-rational explanations for terrorism---such as relative deprivation---would predict.