Intellectual property protection, multinational enterprise, and technological development

The effect of the global system of intellectual property protection (IPP) on growth, welfare, and technological development currently stands at the forefront of international policy disputes. In this dissertation, I investigate two major areas of interest within this debate: industry-specific impacts on technology transfer and general equilibrium effects of trademark infringement. The primary conclusions argue that a variety of factors determine the optimal policy and show which of those factors are preeminent.; After the introduction, I present consecutive chapters that analyze the manner in which multinationals facilitate technology transfer from the North to the South, and the effect of IPP on this activity. Chapter Two uses a partial equilibrium model to show whether a firm will choose to enter a Southern market via exporting, foreign direct investment, or by licensing its technology to an unaffiliated foreign firm. Different industries respond to changes in intellectual property regimes differently, and alter their mode of entry accordingly. Changes in IPP affect the level and the composition of technology transfer, depending on the value of the firm's proprietary asset.; An empirical chapter estimates these claims with count data of multinational activity. Regressions using the Poisson, Negative Binomial, and Zero-inflated Poisson techniques are applied to a data set consisting of 52 countries and 107 industries. I find that industry differences do matter, and that firms dependent on intellectual property respond to increases in IPP with a greater tendency to license.; The fourth chapter takes a broader approach to the question with a dynamic, general equilibrium model of endogenous growth. I introduce trademark infringement into this setting, so that intellectual property embodies both the knowledge of protection and the reputation for quality. Welfare-maximizing levels of IPP may occur at multiple equilibria, depending primarily on the relationship between the value of an innovation and prior levels of infringement. If an economy allows for infringement and imitation, the two forms of IPP will have contrasting results on both the innovation rate and production.