Interpreting U.S. policy toward Iran during the early cold-war years

In order to illuminate the dynamics of U.S. policy and its effects in Iran, the author conducts a systematic analytical study of U.S. policy toward Iran during the early cold war years in general and toward the nationalist regime of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh in particular. The internal problems in Iran were such that both superpowers saw a favorable climate in the country to consolidate their power in Iran and throughout the Middle East.; This study suggests that both "orthodox" and "new left" scholars at best describe U.S. diplomacy in Iran in the narrowest sense with an oversimplification which evoke the wrong questions. Most of the traditional and revisionist literature dealing with the subject is preoccupied with the nationalization of oil industry per-se. These analyses fail to examine U.S. policy toward nationalism in Iran in the context of the rising power of the United States and declining power of Great Britain in post war period and the United States and the Soviet Union determination to fill the power influence vacuum left vacant when Great Britain began to lose its strong footholds in Iran.; Furthermore, traditionalist and revisionist studies do not analyze U.S. policy in direct relation to the internal political struggle in Iran. There is no doubt that the Central Intelligence Agency played a decisive role in overthrowing the Mossadegh government. However, the nationalists' defeat cannot be explained by the C.I.A. operations per-se. The explanation must be sought in the interaction of the class structure with the complex of highly personalized political forces prevailing at the time. This study, therefore, goes beyond traditional and revisionist schools to shed new lights on the logics of U.S. policy formulation and implementation in Iran.