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Three Essays on Competition in Regional Oligopol

Posted on:2019-04-22Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:The Florida State UniversityCandidate:Landgraf, Steven WilliamFull Text:PDF
GTID:1479390017988813Subject:Economics
Abstract/Summary:
This dissertation examines competitive issues among utility-type industries characterized by oligopolistic market structures with the potential for market power. These markets are characterized by geographically-constrained competition, from a sub-national region down to the neighborhood level. Insights from this research can be used to inform policy decisions that attempt to rectify negative consequences of concentrated market structure in essential industries.;Chapter 1 analyzes the potential impact that entry by public (government-owned) Internet Service Providers (ISPs) might have on investment in quality by private incumbent ISPs in local markets. The estimates indicate that the presence of a public entry threat is associated with lower maximum upload and download speeds offered by private cable and DSL providers. However, the presence of a public threat encourages private firm entry, so it is not clear that negative effects on speed are due to crowding out. In states where municipal entry is made more difficult by regulation, these effects disappear. Therefore, restrictive regulation of municipal broadband has a non-trivial effect on competition.;Chapter 2 estimates the minimum number of ISPs required to bring a local market to a competitive level. The estimates, while imprecise, suggest that ISP markets become competitive with three firms, which corroborates previous research in the literature. This suggests that inducing competitive outcomes through entry promotion policies might be a reasonable goal considering the natural tendency towards oligopoly in the industry. However, the technology mix of the local market might affect policy recommendations.;Chapter 3 determines if asymmetric pass-through of costs to prices occurs in wholesale electricity markets, specifically in the pass-through of natural gas prices to natural gas fueled electricity generation. I find some preliminary evidence that suggests that generator output prices respond more strongly to positive changes in the natural gas price than negative changes, and that the size of the asymmetry is more pronounced for generators who have a greater potential to exercise market power.
Keywords/Search Tags:Market, Potential, Competition, Competitive
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