Research On The Efficiency And Policy Effect Of Household Recyclable Waste Recycling System

With the improvement of residents’ purchasing power and the increase of product packaging,the Household recyclable waste(HRW)has increased dramatically.In recent years,our government has made great efforts to improve the recovery rate of HRW,but the it is still very low.The main reasons are summarized as follows:(1)The recycling mode is not standardized,there are a large number of informal recyclers,and the recycling mode of Environmental sanitation engineering group is basically invalid;(2)There are multiple recycling subjects,and no recycling leader has been formed;(3)Although China has formulated policies related to HRW,the incentive policies for recycling are not perfect;(4)The charging policy for garbage that can promote the HRW recycling is relatively backward.For the first question,China first increased the number of formal recyclers.And after July 1,2019,Shanghai,Hangzhou,Beijing and other cities in China successively promulgated and implemented the City household waste management regulations(CHWMR).In order to systematically and comprehensively analyze the HRW recycling situation,this thesis first establishes the HRW recycling system model under the CHWMR regulation in Chapter 3,and puts forward the concept of HRW recycling system efficiency.The HRW recycling system has two recycling channels: through the first channel,residents can sell HRW to recyclers to obtain income;Through the second channel,residents can realize the classified recycling of HRW under the supervision and guidance of waste classification supervisors(WCS)when they drop waste at the garbage collection points.Then,the operation mechanism of the system was analyzed by using system dynamics method,and the key influencing factors of HRW recycling rate in the system were determined.It is found that in the HRW recycling system,the improvement of economic development level can increase the number of HRW recycling,which is conducive to the development of the waste classification recycling industry,but the efficiency of the recycling system will not be improved;Improving residents’ awareness of environmental protection can not only promote the orderly implementation of waste classification and recycling activities,but also promote the efficiency of HRW recycling system.For the second question,as the items involved in HRW are various,low in value,small in quantity and scattered,which are very easy to be discarded by residents in the waste.How to promote the separation of HRW from waste and complete efficient recycling is the key to the smooth operation of the HRW recycling system.At present,there are many recycling entities in the HRW recycling system in China.Considering that different policy implementation objectives have different effects,this thesis compares the impact of different recycling entities on the HRW recycling rate and the interests of each entity under the single recycling channel in Chapter 4.Using game theory,the thesis analyzes the effects of three recovery entities: regular recyclers,recycling company and Environmental sanitation engineering group.The results show that the waste classification supervisor is prone to losses;The recycling efficiency of regular recyclers for HRW is lower than that of recycling company;When the recycling company is the leader of recovery,it requires the lowest level of environmental awareness of residents;When the Environmental sanitation engineering group is the leader of recycling,the profit of each entitiy is the highest.For the third question,based on the above research conclusions and the guiding role of governments in the policy of HRW recycling,the fifth chapter of this thesis analyzes the relevant reward and punishment policies in the aspect of HRW recycling in China.And analyzing the effect of the reward and punishment policies for two single recycling channel models,which has the recycling company and Environmental sanitation engineering group as the recycling leader.The implementation objects of the reward and punishment policy in this thesis include two kinds: one is waste classification supervisors;The other is the recycling company and Environmental sanitation engineering group.Using the method of game theory,the impact of reward and punishment policies on HRW recycling rate,waste classification rate,interests of each entitiy and policies subsidy efficiency of each recycling channel is analyzed.The results show that,with the increase intensity values of rewards and punishments policy,the HRW recycling rate and main entitiy profit in all scenarios are on the rise,but the policies subsidy efficiency will decline,so appropriate reward and punishment intensity values should be selected;When rewarding and punishing the waste classification supervisors,it can promote the effective implementation of waste classification activities;When the mechanical sorting rate of the Environmental sanitation engineering group is high,the Environmental sanitation engineering group can be the leader of recycling,otherwise,the recycling company should be the leader of recycling.For the fourth question,in addition to the reward and punishment policy,the garbage charging policy also has a significant role in promoting the recycling of HRW.Due to the high urban population density in China,the Pay as you throw(PAYT)policy implemented in developed countries is difficult to implement in China.Therefore,a new garbage charging policy PAST(Pay as site throw)is proposed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.This policy requires individuals or single households to pay the garbage fees to WCS,and then implement the garbage charging policy for WCS.The larger the garbage volume is,the higher the payment amount is.At this time,WCS can also increase its income by selling HRW.Using the game theory,this thesis analyzes the impact of PAST policy efficiency on the HRW recycling system.The results show that the PAST policy is more suitable for the HRW recycling system with higher income levels because it will cause loss of benefits to waste classification managers;The implementation of PAST policy in the HRW recycling system with high environmental awareness of residents can achieve higher efficiency of the recycling system.Based on the above research,the seventh chapter of this thesis comprehensively analyzes the impact of three policies(garbage charging policy,garbage charging policy and reward combination policy,garbage charging policy and reward and punishment combination policy)on the efficiency of HRW recycling system.Combining SD with game theory,this thesis analyzes seven scenarios of the implementation of three policy combinations.The results show that in the early stage of PAST policy implementation,the implementation of incentives for waste classification supervisors can reduce the price of HRW recycling,discourage residents from selling HRW,and thus promote waste classification activities;In the later period of PAST policy implementation,the implementation of incentive and punishment policy for recycling company can obtain more total social profits.The innovations of this thesisare as follows:(1)This thesisestablishes a model of HRW recycling system in China,and analyzes its main influencing factors and operation mechanism.(2)Determine the optimal recycling leader under different scenarios to provide theoretical reference for the formulation and implementation of relevant policies.(3)This thesisputs forward a kind of garbage charging policy suitable for China’s national conditions,and analyzes the implementation effect of various combination policies.