Analysis Of Short-Term Equilibrium And Long-Term Evolution Of Anti-Terrorism Resource Allocation And Intelligence Sharing

Global terrorist activities have shown a new development trend since the 21st century,it leads to terrorist attacks in the daily activities of the public at any time,which poses new challenges to the social and public security of governments of various countries.Considering the new characteristics of international terrorism incidents,how to effectively deal with terrorist threats involves not only the issue of armed conflict between the governments and terrorists,but also the issue of cooperation with other countries in strategic interaction.And more importantly,it is also the management problem of the research on the optimal allocation of anti-terrorism resources and the evolution analysis of the anti-terrorism strategies.By analyzing the gaps of existing research,firstly,this paper analyzes the characteristics of international terrorism incidents;then,the optimal allocation of the government’s antiterrorism resources in the short term and evolution mechanism of the dynamic adjustment of the anti-terrorism strategies in the long term are respectively studied.Specifically,this study analyzes the government’s resource allocation to defend against "lone wolf" terrorist attacks in short-term and the evolutionary steady state of long-term defense against cross-border attacks from the dimension of strategic interaction between the government and terrorists.And also analyzes intelligence sharing decisions of governments under the influence of transnational terrorism externalities in short-term and the stochastic evolution and steady state of long-term international anti-terrorism intelligence cooperation.Then main research work of this paper is as follows:(1)In order to enhance the understanding of current global terrorist events,data analysis methods are used to analyze the changes in the characteristics of international terrorist events.Using the most authoritative Global Terrorism Database(GTD)as the research data source,descriptive statistical analysis is carried out on the variation characteristics of international terrorism incidents about the temporal and spatial evolution,the terrorist categories and the terrorist attacks.It provides a scientific basis for governments to make targeted anti-terrorism decisions from the perspective of reducing the probability of successful terrorist attacks and the effect of attacks,and also provides strong evidence for the existence of new characteristics of global terrorist activities in subsequent modeling research.(2)A sequential game model in which the government is the first mover and the terrorist is the later mover is established to explore how the different types of terrorists and the interaction between different defense resources affect the optimal allocation of defense resources and attack strategy in the short term.Results show that the category attribute characteristics of terrorists are the key factors affecting the optimal decision-making of terrorists.Organized terrorist tends to attack all targets in a certain place;while the number of targets of "lone wolf" terrorist depends on their total attack effort level.In particular,if the total attack effort level is too low,the "lone wolf" terrorist will give up the attacks.Interestingly,the government’s allocation(single deployment and joint deployment)and optimization(the optimal amount of defense resource investment)of the two types of defense resources,security personnel and technical equipment,have nothing to do with the category attributes of terrorists,but only depend on the interaction between the two defense resources(complementary,substitute,or independent).(3)Considering the spillover effect of transnational terrorism,this paper analyzes the influence of the externalities of transnational terrorism and the cost of intelligence sharing on the investment of anti-terrorism intelligence resources and intelligence information sharing decisions of various countries in short term.According to the different interest demands of various governments in intelligence sharing,the anti-terrorism utility models of non-sharing,direct sharing and indirect sharing of anti-terrorism intelligence are established respectively.Results show that,on the one hand,whether or not the anti-terrorism intelligence is shared,different externalities are the key factors affecting the optimal intelligence resource investment in two countries.And a country’s optimal intelligence resource investment is inversely proportional to its positive externality coefficient,and is proportional to its negative externality coefficient.In particular,when the externality coefficients of both parties are the same,its influence on the optimal intelligence resource investment and the optimal antiterrorism utility presents a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped trend.On the other hand,in the direct intelligence sharing model,when both parties obtain two-way or one-way positive externalities,they are willing to share a certain proportion of intelligence;when both parties obtain two-way negative externalities,they are unwilling to share intelligence due to their pursuit of maximizing their own interests.However,in the model of indirect intelligence sharing,the pursuit of the maximization of overall interestscan internalize the externalities.At this time,the optimal sharing level of intelligence has nothing to do with transnational externalities,and both of the two parties are always willing to share a certain proportion of intelligence.Moreover,in the two intelligence sharing models,both the processing cost and leakage loss will reduce the sharing level of intelligence.(4)In view of the phenomenon of behavior strategy adjustment between the government and terrorist in the long-term anti-terrorism,an evolutionary game model is established to analyze the evolution law of the dynamic changes of defense and attack strategies,and to balance the protection of social public security and the development of social economy.Results show that the negative effects of deterrent defense measures on socio-economic development,the enhanced effect of cross-border attacks,and the sharing level of antiterrorism intelligence are key factors that determine the dynamic changes and long-term stability of both sides’ behavior strategies.On the one hand,when the negative effect is not obvious,the "deterrent defense" strategy adopted by target country is dominant;when the negative effect is great,the target country always chooses to give priority to socio-economic development at the cost of social security.On the other hand,when the target country shares a certain percentage of anti-terrorism intelligence with other countries to prompt terrorist choosing the cross-border attack strategy,the higher the probability of successful crossborder attack and the greater the economic damage caused by deterrent defense measures,the higher the requirements for the sharing ratio of intelligence;as the enhanced effect of cross-border attacks increases,the requirements for the sharing ratio of intelligence decrease.(5)In view of the phenomenon of behavior strategy adjustment of the member states of the International Anti-Terrorism Alliance(IAA)in the long-term anti-terrorism,a stochastic evolutionary game model is established to analyze the dynamic influence of uncertain factors on the intelligence sharing strategy of the IAA.Results show that the anti-terrorism decisionmaking of "intelligence sharing","intelligence non-sharing" or mixed strategies by the member states of the IAA mainly depends on three factors:irrational stochastic factors,the cost-benefit of different counterterrorism strategies and the size of the IAA.If irrational stochastic factors dominate the decision-making,the cost-benefit of the two strategies and the number of member states determine the member’s strategy choice.If the expected benefit dominates decision-making,only when the number of member states of the IAA is greater than a certain critical size,the "intelligence sharing" anti-terrorism strategy will become the general consensus of all member states;otherwise,the free-ride behavior of "intelligence non-sharing" will become a steady state.