The Analysis To The Institution Of Share-holding Cooperative System Firms

This paper takes analysis to the institution of share-holding cooperative system firms, applies four methods which are research methods limited by research subject, unity between history and logic, logical positivism and ideology of game theory to study four problems which include the origin of share-holding cooperative system firms, the quality of share-holding cooperative system firms, the ownership structure of share-holding cooperative system firms and the development of share-holding cooperative system firms.The origin of share-holding cooperative system firms is caused by the market-orientation process, of which the product market-orientation process and production market-orientation process are two parts. The former helps to increase the peasant' s income, which is the foundation of personal property, and the latter manifests the opportunity of profits, which is the motive of shifting the external into the internal. Then under the frame of institution demand and supply, the feasibility that share-holding cooperative system firms are constructed is discussed. Share-holding cooperative system firms results from the game between central government, village government and peasant in the new circumstance.In the light of the efficiency, government and market construct the rule that the man who possesses the most scare production factor wins an advantage over the property game. The quality of share-holding cooperative system firms lies in that the inner contradiction of collective property develops in the market-orientation process. According to history and reality, factually occupy residual and controlling rights of share-holding cooperative system firms with its own advantage. In CSC firm, village government and the circle of manager stand on the side of capital while the employee stands on the side of labor. Because of the powerful village government, the CSC firm is incomplete market contact.In the property structure, the collective share and the cooperation share arehold by the village government in fact while manager is the key to the firm profits. The Residual and Controlling rights in CSC firm are shared by the village government and the manager. But comparing speaking, village government is powerful than manager. The property structure decides the corporate governance and distribution institution structure. Because village government stands a powerful point, government agency covers property agency and management agency, which results in inefficiency of encourage and monitoring. The feature of distribution structure in CSC firm is not combination of distribution by labor and distribution by share. But in reality, distribution by share could not be carried out. As to labor, distribution by share displays that the employee has the right to distribute because of his share. As to manager, distribution by share means that the manager has the right to distribute because of his human capital.The CSC firm will exist in a long time for the being of immature market, community share and basic political system. Property reform in CSC firm is going along with the market-orientation process, which lead to that the circle of manager will replace village government. The development of share-holding cooperative system firms is up to the game between village government, manager and employee when market-orientation process is going further.