Research On The Problem Of Transformation Of Operation And Management System In State-owned Shipping Enterprise

After state-owned shipping enterprises have reformed into stock companies, the relationship of principal-agent has come into being between the proprietor and the manager. That means the principal makes the agent do something for the principal's profits. By the cause of the different target function between the principal and the agent and the existence of asymmetric information, the agent could use the authorization from the principal to do something benefiting to himself instead of the principal. That is the Principal-Agent problem. In state-owned enterprises during the time of reform of national economic system, one problem is the principal-agent relationship acting like that in general stock companies, another one is that principal-agent chain is too long and low efficient caused by the weak terminal principal of state-owned assets. This thesis makes some principium study about the problem in state-owned enterprises. State-owned shipping enterprises are fundamental and backbone for national economic because of their own specialties. Thereby we can learn much from the resolve of the problem in state-owned shipping enterprises, which is very important and valuable for the reform of other state-owned enterprises. The analysis aims to find the best explanation to the problem or hypo-best one without the best one. Some suggestion rises, after particular analysis about the problem in state-owned shipping enterprises. A perfect deal with principal-agent problem in state-owned shipping enterprises will promote the building of modern enterprise management system and socialist market economic system.