The Behaviors Analysis In The Equipment Acquisition Contract Pricing And The Incentive Mechanism Research

In this paper, Starting form the angle of the outsider which independent of the enterprise and the army, and on the foundation of extensive on the spot investigation, I analyse the Rent-seeking behaviors of aspects with different benefits and the agent problems which including adverse selection and moral hazard behaviors in the equipment acquisition contract-pricing, and attempt to establish corresponding incentive mechanism. In the reseach, I adopt the up-dated theorical analysis tools such as Rent-seeking theory, Cost-benefit analysis, Game theory, Information economy and Principal-Agent theory and etc.Firstly, it is objective analysed the major problems in the equipment acquisition contract-pricing under the current acquisition management system. For example: Contract-Pricing mechanic is unscientific, Incentive and Competitive are insufficient, Rent-seeking behaviors are existed universal, Principal-Agent chain is long, Asymmetrical information is protrudent, and Adverse selection and Moral harzard are unavoidable, and so on.Secondly, with the aids of the economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis and game theory, it is analysed the rent-seeking behviors of different interests-related aspects in the equipment acquisiton contract-pricing, and established their rent-seeking game model, form which we can come to the conclusion that the rent-seeking probability between different aspects depends on the common employment of many factors, which include the probability of successful investigation treated to the rent-seeking behaviors, the punish coefficient to them, the size of rent-seeking costs and net profits.Thirdly, through the tools of the information economy and principal-agent theory, it is analysed the Agent problems in the equipment acquisition contract-pricing and have emphasised on discussing the asymmetrical information and the adverse selection, moral harzard behaviors. Closed on the heels of which, it is set up the corresponding incentive mechanism by stablished mathematics model, from which it is concluded that we can effectively decreasing the asymmetrical information in the equipment acquisition contract-pricing, and in some extent can avoid and surmount the adverse selection and moral harzard after designing some incentive contract and designing observation index scientifically and rational.Last, According to the model conclusion, it is put forward "4 not" institutional innovation, which are " can not do, dare not to do, need not to do and unwilling to do ", through which we can restrain the rent-seeking behaviors effectively, it is also suggested that we should make scientific policies and measures to cure the adverse selection and moral hazard behaviors.