Research On US Congress's Decision-making On Taiwan Issue After The Cold War Based On Two-level Game Theory

The US congress, as the mirror of US internal political changes, has, for a long time and especially after the cold war, interfered with the Taiwan issue which is key to Sino-US relations, and, thus, has for several times challenged the "one-China policy". It is obvious that issue of Taiwan has become a part of the US internal politics.Game between China and the United States on Taiwan issue, including the game between leaders and the game between decision-making bodies, is a two-level game process. This paper, having identified the concept of two-level game, studies the game body, congress sense, game conditions and environment in US congress's involvement in the Taiwan issue.Since there is no settled model for US congress's involvement in Taiwan, this paper starts the analysis from US congress's decision content, motivation, characteristics and constraining conditions in order to explain the whole process of US congress's decision-making on Taiwan issue. At the same time, the author of this paper, with the help of the two-level game theory, analyzes, through the study of two examples, Li Denghui's visit to the United States and Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, US congress's decision-making on Taiwan issue under the influences by various internal political powers.Compared with Taiwan authority's successful canvass, our work on US congress is far from enough. The US congress considers China an oriental arbitrary power and Taiwan an independent sovereignty while China considers the US congress hateful. So, we must strengthen our work on US congress in order to reduce their prejudice but never look forward to it for solve of the Taiwan issue.In the end, this paper points out, from the angle of substitutive game strategy, specific strategies for strengthening work on US congress.