Game Theory Analysis Of Investment Subjects Behaviors In Sports Industry

China's economic has accomplished an admirable achievement and kept annual growth rate of 9% for 30 years since the establishment of reformation and opening policy. However for a long time the sports industry development was disjointed from the economic growth. With so many models we have won on those important international sports event it only indicated that we are a major sport country instead of a strong sport country. One reason caused the slow growth of sports industry in our country is the sports industry investment exists so many problems. The investor, investment scale and investment profitability are the basic elements that prevent sports industry from high-speed development since it is a semi-public social industry. With this background, this thesis provides the applicable analysis of principal-agent model used for the behavioral game of sports industry investment subjects, and considers this model would be the mail solution to the sports industry investment difficulty of our country.The whole thesis is consisted of five sections.The first section:Introduction (Chapter 1). The introduction part describes the background and significance of the thesis topic, and sorts out current situation of domestic and international search. On this basis, the thesis proposes the research method, ideas, emphasis and difficulty; meanwhile it also indicates the innovations and shortcomings of this thesis.The second section:Current situation (Chapter 2). This section focuses on the reason why our country has to implement sports industrialization and the performance of investment behavior. Before analyzing the behavior of investors, it expounds the semi-public social nature of sports industry. This section also explains the main problems existed in sports industry now.The third section:Problems (Chapter 3). This part primarily analyzes the investor of the sports. The analysis bases on two aspects-complete information and incomplete information. The analysis shows that under the conditions of complete information, static game is invalid. Dynamic game (i.e. repeated game) can keep continuous conditionally. In repeated games, the cooperative game end time is a very important parameter. This section also analyzes the main investor behavior games under incomplete information, and indicates the difficulty choice under different situations.The fourth section:Solutions (Chapter 4). This section analyzes the difficulty choices described in Chapter 3, and proposes to use principal-agent model of motivation theories to fully investigate resource allocation efficiency and information rent of sports industry. It also presents the feasibility study practiced when adverse selections and moral hazard exist. In fact the research contents of this section are mainly based on the profit maximization of government (as the principal), private investment department (as the agent), consumer group and the overall social benefits.The fifth section:Policy (Chapter 5). Based on the government (as the principal) and the private investment department (as the agent), this section provides advice on the policy of sports industrialization.