The Problems And Its Countermeasures Of Governmental Intervention In The Vocational Certification Under The Circumstance Of Asymmetric Information

The asymmetric information theory has a point of view that the asymmetric information which exists universally in the markets has strong influence on the efficiency of market mechanism and will lead to the problems such as adverse selection. And signalling is an effective way to solve the problem of adverse selection. On the basis of asymmetric information theory, the thesis proves that the vocational certification is necessary when it plays a signalling role in solving the asymmetric information problems which exist between employers and employees of labor force market, and is effective when it demonstrates employees' cost difference in the vocational certification. From those two aspects, the thesis makes further analyses of the problems and crux of the problems of our governmental intervention in the vocational certification. The thesis holds that China's vocational certifiate system which is dominated by our government must be set up to solve the asymmetric information problems of labor force market and must show the effective signals of the employees' vocational ability. Thus, the thesis puts forward the proposals to improve the vocational certificate system of our country. Finally, the thesis provides a case of publishing certificate system and illustrates particularly the problems and crux of problems of governmental intervention in the vocational certification, thereby presenting countermeasures.