Supervision And Incentive Mechanism Design Base On The Enterprise Group Centralized Purchasing

Centralized procurement, as an important management approach in reducing cost and improving performance in enterprise group, is the procurement mode development trend in the future. Because of the large scale and wide regional distribution of the enterprise group, internal information asymmetry problem is common, which manifests the subsidiaries won't tell the partner company their real procurement needs. It is necessary to the parent company to design a series of mechanisms, which will help to reduce the adverse impact on the centralized procurement because of the speculative psychology of the subsidiaries. This paper divides the subsidiaries into profit oriented and cost- oriented based on the difference of their operation goals, and analyzes the game relationship between the two kinds of subsidiaries and the partner company respectively. In order to assure the centralized procurement operate efficiently, the author suggests the partner company pay some information cost to design some supervision and incentive mechanism by using game theory and principal-agent theory to push forward the subsidiaries submit their needs truly. This paper carries on an investigation into the China Railway Material Company by using the research findings above.In addition, there are 12 figures and 6 tables in the dissertation. We also have referred to 50 reference documents.