Research On Coalmine Safety Supervision Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

Safety is the lifeline of the coalmine production. In recent years, in our country, the overall safety situation is still severe, although the production accident rate has been declining. The one of the fatal reasons of frequent coalmine accidents is the lower Safety supervision efficiency. So, in this paper, based on the evolutionary game theory, the problem of coalmine safety supervision has been researched, in order to dig the deep reason of lower Safety supervision efficiency, and provide advice countermeasures for the improvement of the safety supervision efficiency.In this paper, the current problems of coalmine safety supervision analyzed. The cause of the problem and the concrete forms has been declared in detail. Five reasons of the lower safety supervision efficiency have been provided. There are, institutional setup trigger repetition of supervision; the inadequate investment for safety supervision, neglecting to occupational disease; failed to give full play to the supervision role of the mass media; coalmine safety instrument has own existence problem.Base on the above research, in this paper, the comparative analysis between evolutionary game theory and classical game theory has been provided, then the feasibility of evolutionary game theory was verified. Base on the problems of coal mine safety supervision, according to the relationship with safety regulators stakeholders, the five Game of Govemment and coalmine, coalmine and miners, coalmine and coalmine, coalmine and media and themselves of coalmine safety supervision were determined, the five payoff matrixes established and solved its stable strategy (ESS) and copy dynamic equation, and discussed the model result which combined with the actual situation of safety supervision under the different assumptions.Three typical cases were chosen, about Shanxi coal mine enterprise integration and the report of permeable accident in Wang jailing and the bribery case of Xinzhou, Shanxi Coal Bureau Supervisor. Verified the conclusions by evolutionary game about the cooperation between the coal enterprise in competition, regulatory costs and violation costs. Last, in order to improve coalmine safety supervision efficiency, seven policy recommendations have been given. There are, transformation of government functions, improve the investment of safety supervision, strengthening the safety system construction, strengthen small coalmine safety supervision, attention occupational hazards, strengthen social supervision, and strengthen the construction of safety supervision instrument.