| Personnel economics is defined as the application of microeconomic principles to human resources issues that are of concern to most business. It has grown over the past 20 years to become a major branch of labor economics. Recruitment is one of important parts of personnel economics. This thesis would try to research on the aspects of experience, integrity, and employment contract in the field of personnel employment. Different corporations have distinctive requirement of working experience. Starting from the point of the mutual-game between enterprise and human resources department, this thesis will explain workers'experience selection by providing corporation training standard so as to demonstrate the fact that institutions which own training advantages can on the one hand employ the fledges, on the other hand benefit from it. At the same time, why some big corporations refuse job applicants with work experience can be explained. The verdict will be verified through the statistic collected in actual manpower market.Apart from getting information about personnel, enterprises must make themselves manifested. Sometimes, however, enterprises will lie to the employees for the sake of transient profit. Enterprises and job applicants lie to each other in short-term game, but tell truth in long-term game, by which why long-term workers get more salaries than temporary workers. Through analyzing the faith between enterprises and applicants, I also point to that faith is important and necessary to enterprises.Sometimes, workers are separated into two parts, high capacity and low capacity. I analyze this situation by a dual-adverse selection model. This model can identify the relationship between personnel's ability and sensibility toward market circumstance, and once again, it can be testified by data gained from verification experiment. According to this model, the gap between industries with different capacity workers will expanded. |
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