The Comparison Research On The Motivation Mechanism Of The State-owned Enterprise Managers

The state-owned enterprise controls our economic vitals. The efficiency of the motivation mechanism of our state-owned enterprise managers will affect the state-owned enterprise's economic efficiency at first hand.The article researches on the motivation mechanism of our state-owned enterprise managers and it is based on theory of The Information and Motivation Economics. The article is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the article's backdrop firstly, and defines some important concepts which are referred to the article. At last the chapter recapitulates the article's researching method and arranging. The second chapter reviews and summarizes the prevenient theory of motivation from two aspects: management motivation theory and modern economic motivation. The third chapter reviews several typical motivation modes of our state-owned enterprise managers which are caused by special position in the course of reform and opening to the outside. At last the chapter compares the motivation modes in a nutshell. The forth chapter's content is the article's theory foundation. It describes a commission- surrogate model considered morality risk. The article expounds three aspects: information entirety; surrogate who considers risk elusion and neutral risk under the deficient information. The fifth chapter is the article's principal part. We deduct all kinds of modes' cost in managers' effort base on foregoing mathematic model here. The cost is expressed by all kinds of fixed and risk earning, therefore the model is intuitionistic and the conclusion is easy to understand. The sixth chapter indicates how to set up effective motivation mechanism of the state-owned enterprise managers.The article enumerates these kinds of motivation mechanism: enterprise contract; annual salary system; stock option; employer stock ownership plan; management buyouts. We can deduct some helpful conclusion: contract is unsuccessful because it is hard to decide how much the contract radix is and that information is hard to be validated. Stock option and employer stock ownership plan are influenced by capital market outside of the enterprise. Annual salary system should affiliate secular option earning and stock earning and annuity plan contacted with enterprise's fact. At the other hand, we can take over some risk pledge from the managers. For the enterprise of management buyouts, we analyze it in income-budget curve and sameness avail function because the commission-surrogate relation has disappeared after management buyouts. For the sake of availability of motivation of the state-owned enterprise managers, we must change the state-owned enterprise's configuration of management and set up the omni-directional and multilayer motivation mechanism.