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China's Food Safety Supervision Research Based On The Loss Of Protection Of Consumer Rights And Interests

Posted on:2011-02-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R H XiaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360332456117Subject:Western economics
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In recent years, there are many incidents of food safety, which cause significant loss of the credibility of our government and consumer rights. The regulation of food safety has become one of urgent social problems that our government needs to solve.Especially, the incident that the content of melamine in Sanlu milk powder goes beyond the limit and leads to many infants poisoning in 2008 make the regulation of food safety much more urgent.As the incident of food safety happens frequently, the topic of food monitoring becomes a hot topic in academic research.It seems that the interest of researchers is still warming now.The analysis which combine with our development strategy show that the protection of consumers'benefits has important significance, because the protection of consumer'interests is the main content of the thinking of "people-oriented" and is an important part of the building the socialist harmonious society in China.Economic theories that are used in this dissertation include externality, Information asymmetry, public product, institutional transition etc.And the main research methods used in this dissertation are comparative institutional analysis, historical analysis, and game analysis.After reading the existing literatures at home and abroad, the author finds that the research results of monitoring for food safety is very rich and the research angle is also varied, but there are few literatures at home discuss the regulation of food safety from the angle of the protection of consumer'benefit.The purpose of this paper is to explain the importance of consumer protection in theory and to reveal that it will be inefficiency to construct the food safety controlling system focusing only on the government regulators and producers, but ignoring the consumer protection.It is generally recognized that our aim of strengthening food safety is to protect the interests of consumers. Differently, this study shows that consumer protection is not only one of the objectives of food regulation but also a necessary condition for improving our regulatory system and promoting the efficiency of supervision.Therefore,we believe that consumer protection and strengthening food safety supervision are both mutual promotions and mutual purpose.Strengthening consumer protection regulation can promote efficiency of supervision and improving the regulatory system can also strengthen consumer protection.Thus,consumer protection has always been the core issue of enhancing and improving our food safety regulatory system, and it must be run through the entire regulatory process.This paper utilizes the basic economic theories and combins with he basic national conditions that our country is in transition.It analyses profoundly the reasons of the failure of food safety regulatory. According to the reality that our country is lack of food consumer protection,Ⅰassume that consumers are vulnerable groups whitout discourse power,or because of adverse judicial they have small probability of success in consumer complaints and the cost is great.They did not militate in the basic pattern of the game,accordingly,we believe that they are not in the game and they are not the food interests of the game subject.In this paper, under the condition of the absence of consumers,Ⅰbulid a model of dynamic game of complete information between the food manufacturers and regulators to calculate solution of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.The solution is that companies over forge and regulators over regulate afterwards.We found that this conclusion is highly consistent with the real consequences of afterwards monitoring pattern of food industry, and that it has strong explanatory power. The author compare it with Pareto optimal solution and then illustrate the causes of sub-optimal equilibrium.It shows from the game system's theoretical point of view that the lack of consumer protection will bring our regulatory efficiency losses, and on the other hand, it reflects the necessity and importance of consumer protection.The author also compares several representative countries in food safety supervision in how to protect consumers and have useful conclusions.Finally, basing on the actual situation of domestic and referring to the successful experience of international food regulatory, the author gives some advice and makes a few suggestions for the construction of food safety regulatory system.Of course, this paper also have inadequacy.Firstly,it doesn't acquired enough foreign literature; Secondly,the form of mode in chapter three is beautiful,and the conclusions are highly consistent with the facts,but there is further room for improvement in assumptions of the model.We assume that consumers are either in the game,or not in the game.In fact,the role of consumers is not only these two cases.Between participation and non-participation there are many areas,such as different levels of participation.Apart frpm this,the model is under the assumption of perfect information,and it assumes that regulators and producers have complete rationality which in fact that they may be of bounded rationality.These are areas need to improve in the future;Finally,because of the difficulties of data collection,we can not do empirical test between consumer protection and regulatory efficiency of food safety.
Keywords/Search Tags:consumer rights protection, regulation of food safety, dynamic game of complete information, Sub-game refined Nash equilibrium
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